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Abstract
Revived in 1896 by the Frenchman Pierre de Coubertin, the Olympic Games have
come to represent the ultimate international celebration of sport, culture, and the human
spirit. The grandiose festival of the current day evolved into its mature form throughout
the course of the twentieth century. However, no Olympiad altered the Olympic
Movement as radically as the Berlin Olympics of 1936. Through the examination of key
secondary sources and primary sources like, International Olympic Committee (IOC)
records, personal testimonies, and newspaper articles, this thesis examines how and why
the 1936 Nazi Olympics fundamentally altered the Olympic Movement and forced the
Olympic Games to confront and adapt to a rapidly changing world. While the 1936
Berlin Games set many new precedents in the Olympic Games, three in particular stand
out: the politicization of the host city selection process; the rise of government
investment in Olympic outcomes; and the use of new technology and media.
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Introduction
On April 21, 2016 the Greek gymnast Eleftherios “Lefteris” Petroinias embarked
on the first leg of the Rio 2016 Torch Relay.1 Starting in Olympia, Greece in recognition
of the birthplace of the ancient Olympic tradition, Petroinias was the first of 24,450
torchbearers who were given the honor of carrying the Olympic flame towards Rio.2 The
journey in total traversed three countries and 38,235km before entering the Maracanã
Stadium in Rio de Janeiro on August 5, 2016.3 Finally, at the end of the three-month
odyssey, Brazilian long distance runner Vanderlei Cordeiro de Lima ran the last leg into
the stadium, climbed the stage, and lit the grand Olympic cauldron.4 In front of a packed
stadium and the acting President of Brazil, Michel Temer, Cordeiro de Lima must have
felt a similar rush of emotions as Fritz Schilgen, the very first final torchbearer. Although
Schilgen’s audience in 1936 would have been limited to those in attendance at the
Olympic Stadium in Berlin, no doubt the German distance runner was filled with the
same excitement as his 2016 counterpart when he ran into the crowded stadium, past his
Führer, Adolf Hitler, and lit the inaugural Olympic Flame.
The Olympic Torch Relay, now an inextricable part of the modern Olympic
Games, was a Nazi influenced creation of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Olympic Games in
the midst of the Third Reich were the first truly modern Olympics comparable to the

“Rio 2016 Torch Relay,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 7, 2017,
https://www.olympic.org/rio-2016-torch-relay.
2
“Rio 2016 Torch Relay.”
3
“Olympic Torch Relay Reaches the Finishing Line,” International Olympic Committee,
last modified August 7, 2016,
https://www.olympic.org/news/manual%20news/2016/08/06/olympic%20torch%20relay
%20reaches%20the%20finishing%20line.
4
“Olympic Torch Relay Reaches the Finishing Line.”
1
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spectacle now associated with the event. The Berlin Games can be classified as truly
modern for a number of reasons, but three stand out: first, the politicization of the
selection process; the rise of government investment in Olympic outcomes; and the use of
technology and media. The Nazis unique placement in history and their particular
ideology made the achievements of the 1936 Games possible. Hitler and the Nazis came
to power at a time when the technologies most associated with the Olympics, television
and radio, emerged. The available technology, in conjunction with the Nazi facility for
propaganda and their unrelenting political agenda, propelled the Berlin Olympics into the
modern age.
The man responsible for the revival of the Olympic Games was Pierre de
Coubertin. The Frenchman, born in 1863 to an aristocratic family in Paris, grew up
amidst the embarrassing French defeat at the hands of the Germans in the FrancoPrussian War in 1871. Coubertin interpreted the cause of French defeat as the lack of
physical strength of French youth in the army.5 The war impressed on Coubertin the
value of physical wellness for a nation’s vitality. In his twenties Coubertin had the chance
to travel to England, and the trip proved to be very influential to the young man. While in
England he was impressed by the integration of sport into education and the positive
impact exercise had on student performance and happiness. Strongly shaped by his
travels, Coubertin came to view “athletics and games as key educational activities, able to
produce all-round men and to free French youth from moral and physical inertia.”6

5

Allen Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games (Urbana: University of
Illinois Press, 1984), 8.
6
Eugen Weber, France Fin de Siecle (Cambridge: Bellknap Press, 1988), 224.
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Coubertin’s philosophy, now often referred to as “Olympism,” recognized sport’s unique
ability to bring balance and harmony to a person’s mind, body, and soul.7 In June 1894
Coubertin organized the International Athletic Congress with leaders from international
sports clubs from all over the world. At the congress Coubertin pitched his ambitious idea
for an international sporting contest that would unite different countries and cultures
around the virtuous pursuit of athletic excellence. At the end of the Paris Congress
Coubertin realized his dream. After a vote of the congress, the congress established the
International Olympic Committee (IOC) and Athens was picked as the first location for
the modern Olympic Games.8
In 1896 sports were just beginning to gain significant cultural prominence in
many European and American nations. England had integrated sport into schools,
collegiate athletics started to develop in the United States, and the Germans were famous
for Turnen, “an extremely nationalistic form of gymnastics.”9 Sports increasingly gained
popularity around the world, especially in Europe. However, no international sporting
contests of note existed prior to 1895, when American and English track teams met in
New York for a bi-national meet.10 The 1896 Athens Games were the first major
international sporting event, and country participation reflected the infancy of the
Olympic Movement. Only fourteen countries attended with a total of 241 athletes and

7

Pierre de Coubertin, Olympism: Selected Writings, ed. Norbert Müller (Lausanne:
International Olympic Committee, 2000), 534.
8
International Olympic Committee, Olympic Charter (Lausanne: International Olympic
Committee, 2016), 10.
9
Guttmann, The Olympics: A History of the Modern Games, 8.
10
Richard D. Mandell, The Nazi Olympics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1987),
19-20.
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most of the spectators were Greek.11 To compare, the 2016 Rio Olympics attracted 207
countries and 11,237 athletes.12 International enthusiasm for the Athens Games was
underwhelming to say the least. The Athens 1896 Games would be almost
unrecognizable to a modern audience. Besides the absence of technology, many of the
honored traditions associated with the Olympic Games were not yet established. For
example, a silver medal and a diploma were awarded to the first place winner instead of
the now customary gold medal. Also, the athletic capabilities of the competitors would
not conjure awe among viewers like the athletes of the following centuries. The intense
years of training and preparation expected from the Olympic athletes of today lay far
away from the reality of the 1896 athletes.
During the early years, the organizers of the Olympic Games struggled to gain a
meaningful place in the world’s cultural consciousness as Coubertin envisioned. In 1900
the Games traveled to Coubertin’s beloved Paris, but the French, and more generally, the
international audience, evinced little interest in the revived Olympic Games. The lack of
respect for the games was made apparent by the decision to make the Olympics merely a
supplementary Exposition Universalle Internationale’s programming. The problems with
the 1900 Olympics were numerous. The organizers of the Exposition felt that “sports
were for morons,” an attitude resulting in minimal attention given to the Olympic
competitions.13 Attendance at events was low and the facilities were abysmal. The

“Athens 1986,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017,
https://www.olympic.org/athens-1896.
12
“Rio 2016,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017,
https://www.olympic.org/rio-2016.
13
David Clay Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936 (New York: W.W. Norton &
Company, Inc., 2007), 22-3.
11
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organizers held the track events in a public park with the ever impending danger of a
discus or javelin hitting passing civilians. Meanwhile the swimmers competed in the
polluted Seine River and had to deal with dangerous waters, much like the rowers, openwater swimmers, and sailors competing in the 2016 Rio Olympics.14 The organizers also
stretched the Games out for an unreasonable five and a half months diminishing the
ability of the Games to create any sort of dramatic buildup of excitement. The one bright
spot in the 1900 Games was increased participation. Twenty-four countries accepted the
invitation to Paris, a marked improvement from the fourteen in Athens.15 Yet the
Exposition’s treatment of the Olympics as a mildly interesting sideshow once again made
the Games an underwhelming affair, much to Coubertin’s chagrin.
Leading up to World War I the Olympic Games gradually improved in
organization, participation, and cultural influence. With the exception of St. Louis in
1904, the Games continued to grow after the turn of the century. The 1904 Games in St.
Louis repeated many of the mistakes of Paris. Organizers once again spread the
programming of the Games out over the course of a few months to coincide with the
1904 World’s Fair. St. Louis’ geographical location also deterred many countries from
even sending a team due to the high travel costs and the inconvenience of the transAtlantic journey. Coubertin himself, the founder of the revived Olympics, refused to
make the journey. For the 1904 Games only a total of twelve countries sent teams to

14

Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 23.
“Paris 1900,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 8, 2017,
https://www.olympic.org/paris-1900.
15
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Missouri.16 Even though St. Louis failed to advance the Olympic Movement, the relative
success of next two Olympiads in London and then Stockholm exhibited the growing
popularity of the event. London in 1908 drew more spectators and athletes than the three
preceding Games, as well as a crowd of international journalists.17 London was also the
first instance in Olympic history where the host city constructed a stadium to specifically
accommodate the Olympic Games. The structure built for 1908 boasted space for 70,000
viewers and created the sense of spectacle associated with the modern Games.18 The
following Olympics hosted by Stockholm in 1912 were distinguished as the “proper
athletic festival” Coubertin imagined.19 The Swedish organizers planned and executed the
Games impeccably, unlike their preceding hosts. The Swedish organizers facilitated
events efficiently with the help of new timekeeping technology and an independent
international group of judges. Stockholm also attracted more countries than ever,
including the Eastern country of Japan. Another indication the Olympics successfully
gained prestige on the world stage by 1912 was the involvement of many powerful
international leaders. King Leopold II of Belgium was appointed the honorary president
of the Stockholm Games, and other European royalty even granted Coubertin permission
to use their names on official letterheads and promotional material.20 By 1912 the revived
Olympic Games had become a respected international event drawing participation from
all over the globe.

“St. Louis 1904,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March 9, 2017,
https://www.olympic.org/st-louis-1904.
17
Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 31.
18
Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 23.
19
Mandell, Nazi Olympics, 31.
20
Mandell, Nazi Olympics, 33.
16
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The outbreak of World War I shortly after the successful Stockholm Games
threatened to make the Olympic Games one of its casualties and squelch the momentum
the Games collected during the beginning of the century. In 1912 at the annual IOC
meeting, the committee selected Berlin as the host of the 1916 Games. By 1915 with no
end to conflict in sight Coubertin acquiesced to an increasingly agitated international
community at war and canceled the 1916 Berlin Games. Instead of choosing another host
city at the last minute Coubertin and the IOC decided to cancel the games completely.
Despite the cancellation, the Games had taken a step toward politicization, which the
Nazis would seize upon later in the 1930s.
When the Olympic Games resumed in 1920 in Antwerp the world deeply felt the
effects of war. The host country, Belgium was one of the most severely ravaged nations
during World War I. The daunting tasks of rebuilding after war and readying Antwerp for
the next Olympic Games were compounded by giving a short one-year period of
preparation time to ready the afflicted nation for visitors.21 The result was an underfunded
and under attended event with poor facilities and accommodations. Notably the Germans,
Austrians, Bulgarians, Turks, and Hungarians were not invited to participate in the
Olympics. Their aggression during the war was deemed inconsistent with the peaceful
nature of the Games and until 1936 in Amsterdam they were not invited back again.22
The newly formed USSR opted out of participating by its own choice. Despite difficulties
faced in the execution of the 1920 Antwerp Games, it was a significant year for the
establishment of Olympic tradition. For the first time the iconic five ring Olympic flag

21
22

Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 40.
Large, Nazi Games; The Olympics of 1936, 39-40.
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was raised above the Olympic stadium and the athletes recited the Olympic oath. Still, the
1920 Antwerp Games were compromised by the continued impact of the Great War.
The remaining Games in the 1920s eventually recovered and surpassed the scope
and importance of the pre-war era Games. The 1924 Olympics found their way back to
Paris. Unlike the first Olympiad Paris hosted in 1900, the 1924 Olympic Games did not
have to share the limelight with another event. As if to make up for the lack of attention
paid to the international sporting festival in 1900, the French made certain to fill their
second time hosting with as much celebration as possible. On the first day of Olympic
competition a total of zero events were held. The competitions had to wait until the
second day of the Games because the French organizers packed so much content and
fanfare into the programming of the opening ceremonies there simply was no time for
anything else on the opening day.23 The French showmanship in Paris 1924 raised
expectations for the Olympics that followed. 1924 also brought with it the inaugural
Winter Olympiad in Chamonix, France. Coubertin and the IOC regarded the idea of the
Winter Games warily, suggesting that winter sports did not fit into the ancient Greek
tradition of sport. The IOC also objected to the inequalities inherent in winter sports as
certain climates and terrains not present in all nations were required for success.24 In fact,
the IOC did not recognize the 1924 as an official Olympic Competition until two years
after the events took place. At the 22nd session in Lisbon the IOC reclassified the weeklong series of events in France as the first Winter Olympiad.25 The winter experiment in

23

Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 37.
Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936, 44.
25
Coubertin, Olympism, 522.
24
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Chamonix proved to be a great success and the Winter Olympics were born. From 1924
to 1986 the Summer and Winter Games were held in the same year until the IOC decided
to place the Games on varying schedules.
In 1928 the Olympic Games moved on to Amsterdam. Finally, after missing two
Olympic Games and the inaugural Winter Games, Germany and the rest of the banished
nations received invitations to the 1928 Olympics. The intensity of the athletic
competitions heightened in 1928 as well. In the early years of the Olympics the
Americans usually dominated the competitions. However, in 1928 improvements in
athletic quality around the world were apparent. The winners standing on the podiums
were increasingly international. Victors hailed from a myriad of countries in 1928
including Canada, many Scandinavian countries, Japan, Algeria, and Chile.26 Germany,
despite not participating in an Olympiad since 1912, also had strong performances in
rowing and gymnastics.27
The last Games before the infamous 1936 Olympics were awarded to the city of
Los Angeles. For the second time the Olympics traveled the long distance from the IOC
headquarters in Lausanne, Switzerland to America. When Los Angeles won the honor of
hosting in 1923 the Los Angeles organizers could not have predicted the struggle they
were about to face. The stock market crash of 1929 and the resulting Great Depression
presented a staggering financial problem. However, even though the world experienced
widespread financial strife, Los Angeles turned out to be the grandest Olympic Games
yet. In addition to the construction of a massive stadium with a capacity of over 100,000

26
27

Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 38.
Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 38.
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people, Los Angeles constructed a new auditorium for boxing and wrestling, new
swimming facilities, a shooting range, and stands for 17,000 spectators to watch the
rowing competitions.28 Los Angeles also set itself apart from previous Olympics with the
unique creation of the Olympic Village. In response to athlete complaints about poor
accommodations in years past, the Olympic Village was intended to further Coubertin’s
vision of the Olympics as a uniting force of goodwill. The small city was constructed on
a sprawling hill overlooking the stadium in the hills surrounding Los Angeles.29 The
Olympic Village, although it was a very nice accommodation, only housed the male
athletes. Female athletes lodged at the Chapman Park Hotel.30 The Games of 1932 were a
grand event. Throughout the course of the Games, eventual German Organizers carefully
watched the Americans, took notes, and then patiently waited for their turn to get a crack
at hosting the Olympic Games.
Even before the 1936 Berlin Olympics opened on August 1, 1936 the XIth
Olympiad already created new precedents in the Olympic Movement. The 1936 Olympic
Games politicized the Olympic selection process. Before 1936 the host selection was a
fairly straightforward process. When the IOC did not simply pick a city of one of the
committee members, cities presented the IOC with feasibility studies showing the
logistical and financial capabilities of a city to host. The IOC then voted at the annual
IOC session and a new host city was selected. The 1936 Berlin Olympics turned the

28

Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 39.
Wilson, Gwynn, and F.G. Browne. The Games of the Xth Olympiad: Los Angeles 1932
Official Report (Los Angeles: Wolfer Printing Co., 1933), 292.
30
Gwynn et al., The Games of the Xth Olympiad: Los Angeles 1932
Official, 335
29
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bidding process into an extension of international politics. The political stakes in the
selection process heightened when backlash from an American led threat of a boycott
almost ended Berlin’s Olympic Games before they even started. The presence of the
boycott based on German racial policy also politicized the choice to participate in the
Olympic Games. Accepting an invitation represented a political act in support of the
policies of the host nation.
The Berlin Games ushered in a new era of government involvement in Olympic
outcomes. Prior to Berlin, the Games always minimally interacted with national
governing bodies, but 1936 was different. The Nazi government’s involvement with the
planning, formation of the German Olympic Team, and the financing of the Games was
more intimate than any previous host government. For the Nazi regime the Olympic
Games were a chance to prove its legitimacy and competency to the rest of the world.
The desire for success in the Olympic Games and the calculated messages the Nazis
wanted to convey to the international community resulted in Nazi control of sport within
Germany, and elaborate propaganda efforts. The Nazis’ involvement in the Olympic team
created a shift in Olympic ideology which led to widespread government involvement in
the Olympic Movement. Later in the century and into the new millennium the increased
prestige of the Games and corresponding increased government intercessions manifested
in doping scandals, infiltration of the Olympic planning process, and financial support.
The modern Olympic Games of the current day are unrecognizable without the
technology and media coverage that transports the Olympic Games all the way across the
world, and into audiences’ living rooms. The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the first
Olympic Games that fully utilized the technology of the day for commercial purposes to

13

promote and facilitate the Games. The German Olympic Committee’s (GOC) press
efforts to spread news of the Games worldwide reached more people than ever before
The Berlin Games were also set apart by the use of technological innovations. The radio
broadcasting operation set up by the German Organizing Committee was unrivalled in in
its time and the 1936 Berlin Olympics broadcasted the first televised sporting event in
history. The support of the Nazis also financed the groundbreaking film Olympia, by Leni
Riefenstahl. The cinematic achievement featured brand new techniques and equipment to
the field of sports photography that fundamentally changed how the art developed. The
scale of the media efforts and the technological innovations set the 1936 Olympics apart
from its predecessors, and provided the first instance of a technologically modern
Olympics.
The 1936 Berlin Olympic Games have been extensively written about given the
controversial nature of Nazi regime that organized them. However, scholarship and
investigation into the 1936 Olympics began to emerge in conjunction with the rise of
sports as a historical field of study. One of the two secondary sources this paper relies on
most heavily is the book The Nazi Olympics, written by the historian Richard Mandell.
Mandell wrote and published The Nazi Olympics in 1971 at a time when scholarship
about the modern Olympic Games was almost nonexistent, especially in America. The
Nazi Olympics, the first of its kind, applied scholarly study to the 1936 Olympics. His
work helped lead scholarship towards more comprehensive studies of the modern
Olympics. The other secondary source this paper draws from is the book, Nazi Games:
The Olympics of 1936, by David Clay Large. Large’s book relied on many sources of
primary evidence which were unavailable to the author of this paper, like archive records

14

of correspondence between key Nazi leaders, the correspondence between Olympic
officials, and IOC session minutes. The sources used by Large aided the research of this
paper as they provided access to information otherwise unattainable.
In the secondary sources the sub theme of the modernity of the 1936 Olympics
existed, but was not explicitly explored as an argument itself. From the underlying
argument in the works of Mandell, Large, and others this paper focused on investigating
why the 1936 Olympic Games warrant the classification as the first truly modern
Olympic Games. Mandell focuses on placing a historical lens on the 1936 Olympics to
examine the political and cultural significance of the Nazi Olympics as well as the
modern Olympic Movement more generally. Large, writing in 2007, differed from
Mandell’s work in that he had the advantage of time passed. With more scholarship to
draw from Large attempts to “clear the air”. Given the vast amount of available literature
on the 1936 Olympics in 2007, Large’s goal was to examine Berlin in 1936 and provide a
comprehensive account to dispel some of the popular mythology surrounding the Nazi
Games.
To supplement the secondary sources in this paper various primary sources were
used to deepen analysis of the claims and evidence presented in works like Mandell and
Large’s. The International Olympic Committee Official Reports from every Olympiad
provided a wealth of information. From describing the financing and planning process of
the Olympic Games to listing the winners, the Official Reports proved a useful source to
help illuminate and support the claims of the secondary sources. Newspaper articles were
another primary source that proved helpful. Specifically, American newspapers
illuminated attitudes of the international community towards the Nazi regime and

15

provided a record of how much of the Nazi activity was known to the world and when.
To gain insight into more personal experiences relating to the 1936 Olympic Games the
University of Southern California Shoah Foundation collection of oral histories
contributed fascinating personal testimonials. The video interviews recorded the stories
and experiences of Jews in relation to the Berlin Olympics. With the combination of
primary and secondary source this paper analyzed a new line of argument in relation to
the 1936 Olympic Games.
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Chapter 1: The Politicization of the Selection Process
Before the Olympic competition actually commences, potential host cities scrap
and scrape their way to obtain the now coveted opportunity to host the Olympic Games.
The IOC bid process more than likely is not what is conjured in the imagination of people
across the world when they think about the Olympic Games. However, the selection
process has become as much of a game as the sporting competitions themselves.
Throughout the course of the Olympic Games the selection process became highly
regulated by the IOC and quite extensive. The 1936 selection process aided the evolution
of the because it politicized the proceedings and opened the procedure up to abuses.
The selection of Athens as the host city for the inaugural 1896 Games was rather
informal compared to the three yearlong application process of current Olympiads. The
first Olympic Congress, organized by the efforts of Pierre de Coubertin, united leaders of
sport clubs and organizations from around the world at Paris-Sorbonne University to
discuss the revival of the Olympic Games. In June 1984 over 2000 people attended
Coubertin’s congress.31 During the final meeting of the congress on June 23 all of
Coubertin’s efforts were rewarded when the congress unanimously voted to revive the
Ancient Olympic Games.32 The congress also established the initial fourteen member
International Olympic Committee (IOC) as the first official governing body of the
revived Olympic Movement.33 Finally, as the last order of business the congress decided

31

Pierre de Coubertin, Timoleon J. Philemon, N. G. Politis, and Charalambos Anninos,
Second Part: The Olympic Games in 1896 (Athens: Charles Beck, 1897), 8.
32
“I Olympic Congress –Paris 1984,” International Olympic Committee, accessed March
9, 2017, https://www.olympic.org/paris-1894-olympic-congress.
33
Coubertin et al., The Olympic Games in 1896, 8.
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to hold the first Olympic Games in the year 1896. At the suggestion of the Greek man
Demetrius Vikelas, the eventual first president of the IOC, the congress selected Athens
as the first locale.34 Given the historic connection of Athens to the Olympic Games the
congress and newly created IOC easily selected the first host city. The matter of the
location of the second Olympiad was also settled at the first Olympic Congress. Paris,
France received the distinction of hosting the second Olympiad in 1900 to coincide with
the World’s Fair.35
After the irregular selection process for the first two Olympiads the host city
selection process did not immediately become the well laid out process known today. The
selection process for the 1904 Games started to set important precedence for following
Games despite its unusual circumstance. Initially, at the 1901 session, the IOC chose
Chicago as the host of the 1904 Olympics. However, conflict arose when the World’s
Fair in St. Louis was pushed back from 1903 to 1904 and the Missouri city presented
itself as another option.36 After a vote of the IOC in 1902 St. Louis officially secured the
1904 Olympic Games. Even though Chicago lost the 1904 Games, the city of Chicago
went about securing the Olympic Games with elements of what are now requirements in
the selection process. First, a committee of interested Chicagoans formed with the
purpose of seeing to the planning and support of the potential Olympic Games. The
group, named the Chicago Committee, “included the heads of three major banks in

34

Coubertin et al., The Olympic Games in 1896, 8.
“Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List”, Historical Archives: Olympic Studies Centre,
last modified April 15, 2011, https://library.olympic.org/Default/archiveshistoriques.aspx, 2.
36
“Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 6.
35

18

Chicago, the president of the Art Institute, the president of the University, a qualified
representative of the press, and five or six ‘prominent’ citizens.”37 The Chicago
Committee reflects the selection process standard of establishing an organizing
committee before making a bid. The aforementioned committee also submitted a
comprehensive file to the IOC. The file contained a variety of documents and studies
relating to the feasibility of the city’s ability to host the Games. Documents like a signed
statement from the University of Chicago’s president promising the use of the
university’s playing fields for free, a rough financial plan to finance the affair with
200,000 francs already secured, and a rough outline of a schedule of all the sports
competitions and cultural events.38 The Chicago Committee finally also established the
convention of hiring advocates to convincingly persuade the IOC. Mr. Henry Bréal, an
attorney, successfully swayed IOC support and elicited enthusiasm from the prestigious
Olympic committee.39 Although the 1904 Olympic selection was unusual, the preparation
and care shown by the Chicago Committee to convincingly prove to the IOC that the city
of Chicago could logistically support the Olympic Games became the minimal standard
in the selection process prior to 1936.
In the early years of the Olympic Games the selection process was very
unregulated. Interested host cities provided feasibility studies and documents to the IOC
and then the IOC voted for the most attractive option, or went with the choice of an IOC
member (most likely Coubertin).40 The process was not yet meticulously laid out and

37

Coubertin, Olympism, 399-400.
Coubertin, Olympism, 400.
39
Coubertin, Olympism, 400.
40
“Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 20.
38
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technically no requirements existed in the IOC’s Olympic Charter. The selection process
was governed by precedence and the judgement of the IOC. The minimum standards in
the selection process from the early twentieth century up to 1936 were simply a financial
and logistic report demonstrating the capability of the potential host city to handle
demands of the Games. The only major change to the selection process leading up to the
selection of Berlin in 1936 was the inclusion of the Winter Games. After the first Winter
Games in 1924 the IOC allowed the host city selected for the Summer Olympics the first
shot at hosting the Winter Olympics. Following 1924 if a city wanted to host both they
would have to prove the feasibility for both Games. An “official selection procedure” was
not installed until 1947 for the selection of the 1952 Olympics.41 The new procedure only
required candidate cities to give a 30-minute presentation in front of the IOC.42 The
extensive two to three-year process of today resulted from an evolution of the IOC
charter to curb abuses and corruption within the Olympic Movement originating in 1936.
Berlin marked the first instance of under the table tactics and leveraging political
influence to succeed in the selection process.

Selecting Berlin
Germany started down the long road to the 1936 Berlin Olympics long before
1931 when the IOC selected Berlin as the host for the Eleventh Olympiad. Back in 1912
the IOC selected Berlin to host the 1916 Olympic Games. Berlin won the bid in 1912
because of a generous donation secured by the city of Berlin from The Union Racing

41
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“Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 37.
“Olympic Summer Games: Fonds List,” 37.
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Club allowing for the construction of an Olympic stadium.43 Like today, in 1916 the IOC
would shy away from a bid without secure funds to support the expensive endeavor.
Theodor Lewald’s role in the organization of the 1916 Games in Berlin laid some of the
groundwork necessary to secure the bid almost twenty years later. Lewald’s efforts most
impacted the procurement of funds. As a high-level government official, Lewald played a
substantial role in securing financing for the 1916 Games from the reluctant Reichstag.
After the efforts expended in 1916 Lewald and the German sports world were prepped
with the necessary experience to see the 1936 Olympics through to fruition.
While Berlin’s selection for 1936 was not the first time the city had been
successful obtaining the honor of hosting, the efforts the second time around held more
weight for national pride. Hosting offered Germany a chance to redeem itself and reenter
the international community after World War I, and the efforts of the organizers were
reinvigorated after Germany’s strong performance at the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics. The
process began at the annual meeting of the IOC on April 27, 1927 in the city of Monaco
when the German member of the IOC, Theodor Lewald presented Berlin’s bid to host.44
However, despite Lewald’s early bid, the final votes were not cast until 1931. The
beginning of Lewald’s unprecedented bid campaign started in 1930. Lewald convinced
the IOC to hold the Ninth Olympic Congress in the city of Berlin. Hosting the Congress
provided an opportunity for Lewald and other Berlin boosters to showcase the
competency of Berlin and the city government. President Hindenburg even opened the
Congress held at Berlin University and announced to the members of the IOC that should
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they select Berlin, the Reich Government fully supported the Olympic Games.45
Although now the presence of important politicians and celebrities is commonplace in
cities’ quests to host, in 1930 Lewald introduced the Olympic world to the art of
schmoozing.
Also being considered for the 1936 Games at the time of the Congress in 1930
were Rome and Barcelona. Rome, under the control of a fascist government led by
Benito Mussolini presented less of a threat to Lewald and Berlin. The members of the
IOC shied away from Rome because of “the fascist government’s domination of Italian
sport.”46 Irony abounds given the installation of the Nazi Regime and the “Aryanization”
of sport within Nazi Germany a mere three years later. To undermine both Rome and
Barcelona, Lewald employed the Prussian Meteorological Institute to conduct a study
predicting unfavorable weather conditions during August in the two cities.47 Carl Diem
then disseminated the study through a Dutch newspaper. Lewald’s efforts to convince his
fellow IOC members resembled a political campaign. The German representative
peppered his colleagues incessantly with letters urging them to vote for Berlin and
express their support to the IOC president Baillet-Latour with letters of their own.48
Lewald also used the weight of political officers to sway foreign IOC delegates. For
example, Lewald asked the two German ambassadors to Japan to personally visit the
Japanese IOC officers to convince them to vote for Berlin. The personal house call
worked, both Japanese representatives voted for Berlin. Although, in exchange for
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Japanese votes Lewald agreed to support Tokyo for the 1940 Olympic Games.49 Another
factor working in favor of Berlin was the political turmoil within Spain during 1931 when
the IOC scheduled its annual meeting in Barcelona. Most IOC delegates sent in their
ballots remotely because of the political instability from the recent installation of the
Second Spanish Republic not too long before the IOC meeting.
The use of political relationships in the selection process for the 1936 Olympic
Games led to the politicization of the host city choice. Not only did Lewald utilize the
Weimar Republic President Paul von Hindenburg to advocate for Berlin, but he also took
advantage of the political influence of the German ambassadors to Japan to secure votes.
Other IOC members and Olympic bid committee members carried on and intensified
Lewald’s tactics. The very next bid process for the 1940 Olympic Games exhibited the
same type of diplomatic maneuvering as Lewald in the late 1920s and early 1930s. The
serious contenders in the running for the 1940 Olympic Bid were Tokyo, Rome, and
Helsinki.50 The Tokyo organizers, eager to win the bid and bring the Olympics to the East
for the first time, decided to campaign using diplomacy. Prior to the 35th Congress of the
IOC in 1935, Japanese IOC officials paid a visit to Benito Mussolini, the Prime Minister
of Italy.51 Following Mussolini’s visit with the Japanese officials Italy’s premier gave a
“sensational show of support for the Tokyo bid” and Rome withdrew its bid for the 1940
Games.52 The next year in the 36th session of the IOC Tokyo beat out Helsinki and
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secured the bid for 1940. Although Japan would be later stripped of the ability to host
because of the Japanese government’s refusal to disengage from the Sino-Japanese War
in 1937, the state-to-state campaign tactic once again prevailed in the Olympic selection
process.53
Lewald’s new diplomatic route to hosting using the influence of political figures
and national governments gained more prominence during the Cold War era. The efforts
expended by the Richard Nixon administration to keep the Soviet Union from obtaining
the bid for the 1976 Summer Olympics exemplified how political influence was used to
aid the selection process after 1936. Initially, the Nixon administration showed little
interest in giving more support than a generic three sentence statement of encouragement
to the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee that read, “I want to take this opportunity to
congratulate you and the Los Angeles 1976 Olympic Committee for obtaining the
privilege of bidding for the 1976 [Olympic Games]…My best wishes to you and to the
Committee.”54 The president of the Los Angeles Committee, John Kilroy continually
requested aid from the Nixon administration, but all of Kilroy’s pleas, including a grant
for $250,000, were rejected.55 Even a request to simply give a presentation to President
Nixon was turned down. Met with nothing but disappointment, the Los Angeles
Committee decided to change their strategy. With the help of an old business relationship
between Rodney Rood, a member of the Committee, and H.R. Haldeman, the White
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House chief of staff, the Committee framed the need for government assistance in the
language of Cold War conflict. In a letter to Haldeman. After pointing out the Soviet’s
ambition to obtain the 1976 Olympics, Rood wrote, “We are now in direct confrontation
with the Soviet Union on the level of international politics – a confrontation to determine
international public appeal under the guise of non-politics – the award of the Summer
Olympic Games of 1976.”56 The Los Angeles Committee had good reason to desperately
seek aid from the US government, given the Soviet government vehemently supported
the Moscow bid. The appeal to American political interests proved extremely effective.
Not only did the Nixon administration honor almost all of the requests of the Los Angeles
Committee, but Nixon exerted his international influence as the President of the United
States to influence the 1976 selection process. Nixon personally wrote to members of the
IOC praising the city of Los Angeles and its bid, he instructed US ambassadors in
countries with IOC members to put pressure on foreign administrations to encourage the
IOC representatives to vote for Los Angeles, and Charles Stuart a representative of the
Nixon administration attempted attain votes by bribing Latin American IOC members.57
Similarly, the Moscow organizing team utilized the Soviet Union’s political position to
obtain votes for Moscow. In the final vote, Moscow received twenty-eight votes from the
twenty-eight communist nations represented in the IOC.58 Although the efforts of the Los
Angeles Committee coupled with the Nixon administration, ultimately failed as Montréal
received the 1976 bid, the Los Angeles Committee and the Moscow organizers both
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utilized the diplomatic resources available to them and the prevailing political climate of
the time.
In the current selection process, similar to 1936 and the Cold War era, leveraging
the support of diplomatic leaders has become paramount during the Olympic bidding
process. One of the most common tactics used by bid committees is to bring prominent
world leaders to their presentation to the IOC to illustrate governmental support and use
their influence to potentially sway IOC members. For example, Barack and Michelle
Obama travelled to Copenhagen during his presidency to present in front of the IOC on
behalf of the Chicago bid for the 2016 Olympic Games.59 Besides Chicago’s failure to
obtain the bid for 2016, power politics in the selection process have proven to be an
effective tactic in the new millennium, unlike the mixed success it received during the
Cold War. In the case of the 2012 London Summer Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Winter
Olympics, the leveraging of national leadership helped secure both bids. The British
Prime Minister Tony Blair actively campaigned at the deciding IOC session and made an
effort to meet individually with various IOC members, thus propelling the London bid to
victory despite its underdog status.60 Vladimir Putin, in the bid process for the 2014
Winter Olympics, was an active member of the bid process. During the Sochi
presentation Putin sat with the Russian delegation at the IOC session in Guatemala, and
vehemently supported the Sochi Committee’s efforts.61 Without the support of Putin the
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first time Sochi bid could not have overcome the strong competition coming from
traditionally successful winter venues like, Salzburg, Austria.62 The politicization of the
selection process originated with Lewald and his savvy use of political figures like, the
German President Paul von Hindenburg and German ambassadors. In the years following
1936, the bid process remained very political with bid committees attempting to utilize
prominent international figures and political attitudes like the Los Angeles Committee for
the 1976 Olympics. As time progressed into the new millennium, the force of power
politics came to the forefront of candidate strategies with the success of London 2012 and
Sochi 2014.
Lewald’s unofficial campaigning efforts during the selection process also opened
the door for corruption within the Olympic selection process which has significantly
shaped the formation of the process as it is known today. The largest and most public
corruption scandal from the post 1936 era of the Olympics occurred over the IOC’s host
selection of the 2002 Olympic Winter Games held in Salt Lake City. Previously, many
instances of corruption passed by without much public knowledge, like the bribery during
the Nixon administration. In contrast the Salt Lake City scandal erupted very publicly on
November 24, 1998 when a Salt Lake City television station broke the news that the Salt
Lake Olympic Organizing Committee (SLOOC) continuously payed for Sonia Essomba’s
tuition, rent, and expenses at the American University, a bill that totaled approximately
$108,350.63 Sonia Essomba was the daughter of René Essomba, an IOC member from
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Cameroon. After news of the bribery of Essomba, further investigation into the SLOOC
revealed numerous additional instances of bribery far exceeding the gifts limits set by the
IOC. In 1991 the SLOOC and the Salt Lake Bid Committee (SLBC) developed a
“scholarship assistance” effort which provided $400,000 worth of aid to thirteen students,
six of which were closely related to IOC members.64 The SLOC’s financial aid program
only began to reveal the extent of the gifts and services doled out by SLOOC
representatives to secure IOC votes. In total the IOC expelled six members, and four
more resigned of their own volition, for accepting gifts and other financial benefits from
the SLOOC exceeding the $200 limit.65 The worst offender was the IOC member from
the Republic of the Congo, Jean-Claude Ganga. In addition to a $60,000 profit made off
of a sale of land orchestrated by a SLOOC and $70,010 of direct payments, Ganga visited
Salt Lake City six separate times incurring over $115,000 worth of travel expenses paid
for by the SLOCO.66 During Ganga’s visits himself and members of his family received
medical treatments worth $28,000 for free.67 Although Ganga capitalized on the
generosity of the SLOOC and SLBC the other members expelled from the IOC received
similar types of compensation for their votes in favor of Salt Lake City.
The actions of the SLOOC were not an isolated incident. The practice of bribing
IOC members was established years prior. After the Salt Lake City debacle, the IOC
investigated the Olympic Games of years past and uncovered uncouth behavior from a
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whole host of IOC members. Lewald’s friendly persuasion of his fellow IOC members
did not reach the level of bribery, but his persuasive innovations led to corruption within
the IOC. The bribery of IOC officials originated from intense competitive culture of the
selection process, created by Theodor Lewald in the 1930s in combination with the
commercialization of the Olympic Games in the 1980s. The 1984 Los Angeles Olympic
Games were the first to turn a profit with no government debt, and the profitability of the
IOC and the host cities increased temptations to engage in corrupt behavior. Through the
investigation prompted by the Salt Lake City scandal the scrutiny uncovered actions like
Amsterdam’s guilt in supplying IOC members with gifts like prostitutes, jewelry, and
VCRs in hopes of obtaining the 1992 Olympics bid.68 Other cities’ indiscretions came to
light as well. Nagano, Japan hosted various members of the IOC sixty-two times and
spent an average of Can$33,000 per visit to secure votes for the 1998 Winter Olympics.
Atlanta, the 1996 host, also admitted to gifting IOC members sets of $475 golf clubs,
providing free trips to Disney World, and paying for extra first-class airline tickets.69 In
response to intense international criticism, disappointment, and anger over corruption the
IOC overhauled the bidding process. To begin the IOC established an independent Ethics
Commission in 1999 to create a code of ethics and oversee the bid process.70 The IOC
then created a second group named the IOC 2000 Commission, which was tasked with
researching avenues for reform and providing recommendations of how the Olympic
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Movement should be structured going into the new millennium.71 After a vote of the IOC,
fifty recommendations submitted by the IOC 2000 Commission were adopted. The most
important changes to the selection process included, the prohibition of IOC members
from traveling to the bid cities, the creation of an impartial Evaluation Commission
responsible for visiting bid cities, and the admission of press and media into IOC sessions
in order to increase transparency.72
The current bid process adopted in 2014 revised the selection process even more
for the purpose of providing more aid and dialogue between the IOC and candidate cities.
The process, now very regimented at every step includes an informal Invitation Phase
followed by a three-part Candidature Process aimed at looking into the specialized needs
and challenges of each host candidate.73 The mature selection process of the current
Olympic Games resulted from a progression of campaigning tactics employed by
Theodor Lewald for the first time in 1936, which politicized the selection process and
eventually became rife with corruption. Although the IOC attempted to limit corruption
within the process, the presence of politics within the bid became a naturalized aspect of
the long journey to hosting.

The Boycott Movement
The 1936 Berlin Olympics experienced threats of boycott from Western
democracies adding to the significance of the 1936 Olympics in the development of the
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modern Olympic Games. As David Clay Large observes in his book Nazi Games: The
Olympics of 1936, “In 1936, for the first time in modern Olympic history, a protest
movement of international scope was mounted against a designated host city, Berlin.”74
The 1936 Olympics were a vessel through which the international community sought
political change, a trend which became a prevalent aspect of subsequent Games.
The Berlin Games were not boycotted from the outset of their selection. After the
cancellation of the 1916 Berlin Games after World War I, Theodor Lewald, a German
member of the IOC, tirelessly campaigned to bring the Olympic Games to Berlin. The
efforts of Lewald came to fruition on May 13, 1931 when IOC president Henri de BailletLatour revealed that Berlin received more votes than its competitor Barcelona to become
the host of the 1936 Olympics.75 At the moment of Berlin’s selection the Weimar
Republic, a parliamentary Republic, governed the post-war German state.76 Unbeknownst
to the world and the IOC during the selection process in 1931, in January of 1933
President Paul von Hindenburg would appoint Adolf Hitler to the chancellorship and
effectively hold open the door for Hitler to usher in the Third Reich.77 During the rise of
the National Socialist German Worker’s Party, the members of the international
community turned their eyes warily towards the new regime to see what was to happen
when, as the American journalist George Gerhard from the North American Review
phrased it, “Herr Hitler comes to bat.”78 When Hitler and the Nazi Party gained complete
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control of the German government much of the world already knew about their racially
exclusionary policies. The Nazis’ published political platform of twenty-five points
offered a transparent look into the party’s intentions from as early as 1920. One of the
most concerning Nazi political promises in the eyes of the international community was
the fourth point in Hitler’s program. It read, “Only a national comrade can be a citizen.
Only someone of German blood, regardless of faith, can be a citizen. Therefore, no Jew
can be a citizen.”79 From 1933-35 the discrimination against Jews and other minorities
escalated under the influence of Nazi politics and drew great concern from the IOC and
many individual countries about sending teams to Berlin in 1936. The spirit of
conscientious objection in relation to the Third Reich’s policies manifested through the
threat to boycott the Berlin Games. While sentiments leaning towards boycotts existed in
multiple countries, including England and France, the boycott effort in the United States
proved the most threatening.80
Soon after Hitler’s ascent to power in January of 1933 the anxieties of the IOC
regarding the Nazis’ treatment of German Jews proved to be substantiated. In June 1933
Jewish athletes were prohibited from joining sports organizations and were banned from
many sports facilities. The exclusion of Jews from sports violated the laws of the
Olympic Games stating there should be no discrimination in the Games on the basis of
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race or religion.81 In addition, Theodor Lewald lost his position as President of the
German Olympic Committee (GOC) because of a Jewish relative and was replaced by the
Nazi Party member Hans von Tschammer und Osten.82 In response, at the next annual
IOC meeting in Vienna on June 7, 1933 the American IOC officials Charles Sherrill and
William May Garland grilled the German IOC officials, Lewald and Karl Ritter von Halt
about Jewish discrimination in German sport. By the end of the session Lewald and von
Halt obtained a written statement from the Reich Interior Ministry stating, “All the laws
regulating the Olympic Games shall be observed. As a principle German Jews will not be
excluded from German Teams at the Games of the XIth Olympiad.”83 Lewald was also
reinstated to a lower position on the GOC. Satisfied with the written guarantee and
ceremonial appointment of Lewald, Sherrill and Garland returned to the United States
quite pleased with themselves and the word of the Reich Interior Ministry.
Despite Sherrill’s satisfaction with the 1933 IOC session in Vienna, American
organizations like the American Jewish Congress (AJC), the Amateur Athletic Union
(AAU), and the American Olympic Association (AOA, and sometimes referred to as the
American Olympic Committee) doubted the sincerity of the assurances given in Vienna.
The boycott in the United States was largely initiated by the AAU. The organization
pressed the AOA to withdraw American participation from the 1936 Games if Hitler did
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not reverse his discriminatory policies towards Jews.84 In November of 1933 Gustavus
Town Kirby presented a resolution to the AAU, which was then adopted, unambiguously
threatening to withdraw American participation from the Games should discriminatory
policies remain unchanged. Kirby also presented his resolution to Sherill and the AOA,
but encountered resistance from Sherill who found Lewald’s promises of change
sufficient.85 In a compromise, the AOA passed a resolution with the same intent as the
AAU resolution, but “the threat was toned down.”86
The American boycott movement may very well have been successful if it had not
been for one man, Avery Brundage, the president of the AOA. Brundage’s efforts in 1934
and 1935 swayed the AOA to vote in favor of American participation in the 1936
Olympics. Initially, Brundage vehemently expressed his distaste for discrimination in the
Olympics during an interview with the Baltimore Jewish Times in April of 1933, where
he stated, “the Games will not be held in any country where there will be interference
with the fundamental Olympic theory of equality of all races.”87 By 1934 the leadership
of the AOA remained uncertain Hitler and the Nazi government would honor their
commitment made in Vienna the year before. In June of 1934 the AOA voted to postpone
accepting the German invitation to Berlin until Avery Brundage conducted an official
investigation into the treatment of German Jewish athletes. Brundage agreed to the
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investigation and within the month he and his wife set sail for Europe. Brundage carried
out his investigation with as much conviction as a Division I Southeastern Conference
football coach looking into allegations of misconduct against their star player. Brundage
never thoroughly investigated the treatment of Jewish athletes without Reich influence.
For example, while conducting the inquiry an appointed translator accompanied him at
all times and he was unable to interview representatives from Jewish sports club without
supervision.88 In addition, Brundage’s friendships with Theodor Lewald, Carl Diem, and
Karl Ritter von Halt made him sympathetic towards the organizers and more inclined to
take their assurances on faith.89 While in Germany Brundage also met with the
Reichssportfuhrer Hans von Tschammer und Osten who once again assured Brundage
that Jewish athletes would be allowed to compete on the German Olympic team.
Brundage returned to the United States and presented the AOA a glowing report of the
Nazi commitment to repeal discriminatory practices. At the meeting of the AOA in
September 1934 the association unanimously voted to accept the German invitation to the
1936 Games.90 Kirby, initially a strong opponent to participation, addressed the
committee, including President Brundage, and said, “Mr. President, we have every right
to believe from your report that Germany will not dare recede from the position she has
taken.”91
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The AOA may have been convinced by Brundage and his questionable
investigation, but the matter of American participation was not completely settled until
the AAU voted in favor of participation in December of 1935. The AAU in the first half
of the twentieth century heavily involved itself with the AOA and certified all track and
field athletes for the United States’ Olympic Team.92 Thus AAU acceptance of
participation became a necessary component to send a large and skilled USA team to the
Olympics. On December 9, 1935, only eight months away from the Summer
competitions and only two months away from the Winter Games, the AAU voted against
a boycott in a very close decision with only a margin of about three votes.93 The
reasoning behind participation was based on trusting assurances from German officials
that German Jewish athletes would not be discriminated against in the Olympic Games.
The American boycott nearly succeeded, but once the AAU decided against boycotting
the Games, the oppositional sentiment around the world ceased as well.
Abuses against German Jews in general within Germany were seen by Brundage
and other members of the important Olympic governing bodies as private political
matters of Germany not to be intervened in by Olympic Committees.94 However, despite
Brundage’s reluctance to interfere in German politics one must wonder how he, and
others who voted to send Americans to Berlin, believed the promises by German officials
like Lewald, Ritter, and von Tschammer. Brundage and other politically up to date
Americans would have been aware of the abuses against German Jews. Only about a year

92

Large, Nazi Games: The Olympics of 1936, 71.
New York Times, “A.A.U Backs Team in Berlin Olympic; Rejects Boycott,” December
9, 1935.
94
Guttmann, The Games Must Go On, 71.
93

36

after Brundage’s visit, on September 15, 1935 Hitler passed the Nuremberg Laws. The
legislation made interracial relationships between Jews and “Aryans” illegal, stripped
Jews of their citizenship, and defined a Jew as any person with three or four Jewish
grandparents.95 American newspapers, like the New York Times followed the developing
situation in Germany and reported on the escalation of German policy. Men like
Brundage would have been aware of what was happening in Germany as headlines such
as, “Anti-Jewish Laws Passed” and “Non-Aryans Deprived of Citizenship and Right to
Intermarry” peppered the front pages of newspapers across the country.96 Given the
Olympic officials’ knowledge of the escalation of racially discriminatory laws it is
illuminating that Brundage and other AAU members communicated confidence about the
assurances they received. Brundage and others’ choice to ignore the news of escalating
racial discrimination coming out of Germany displays the intense desire of the Olympic
administrators to hold on to the apolitical and peacekeeping façade of the Olympic
Games.
Despite Brundage and the decision of the AOA’s and AAU to send an American
team to Berlin, there were many individual athletes from around the world who chose to
sit out of the Berlin Games. However, it should be noted that the personal boycotters did
not represent a large number of athletes. Never before had the Olympic Games seen such
a large number of individual athletes abstain from Olympic competition out of protest.
One athlete who stayed home in 1936 was the Jewish Romanian fencer Endre Altman.
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He explained his decision saying, “I refused to go Berlin…it was a stand of solidarity
with what was happening to them, German Jews... The Olympics didn’t lose much by me
not participating, but it is my satisfaction.”97 Altman’s reasons reflected the sentiment of
a number of other athletes who chose not to go to Berlin. The personal boycotters were
primarily Jewish athletes. Other notable boycotters included three American track
runners, Canada’s number one light weight boxer Yisrael (“Sammy”) Luftspring, a
French bobsledder, and three of Austria’s top ranked swimmers.98 The personal boycotts
by Jewish athletes signified a new era of the Olympic Games. Conscientious objection by
Jewish athletes regarding the discrimination of German Jews turned the Olympic Games
into a political stage. By staging this boycott, the athletes set a moral precedent asserting
that participating in the Games represented a tacit endorsement of the host nation.
The boycott movement of the Olympic Games has become a staple of the modern
Olympic Games after its first use in 1936. Although zero nations went through with a
boycott of the German Games, the 1936 the boycott movement established a powerful
option nations used in later years. Olympic participation became a way to voice concerns
about international politics and came to be understood as the acceptance of the domestic
and foreign policies of host nations, and even other participating nations. Throughout the
rest of the century the concept of boycotting persisted and evolved. The significant years
that experienced boycotting included 1956, 1964, 1976, 1980, 1984, and 1988. Boycotts
were held for a variety of reasons, including the protest of apartheid era South Africa,
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Chinese-Taiwan relations, and Cold War era fear. However, the boycott of the 1980
Moscow Olympic Games, because of the Cold War and the Soviet Union’s invasion of
Afghanistan, best illustrates the politicizing impact of the near boycotts in 1936 on
Olympic ideology. In Jimmy Carter’s address to representatives of the United States’
Olympic team set to go to Moscow, he touched on the legitimizing action of participating
in the Olympic Games:
The Olympics are important to the Soviet Union. They [Soviet Union] have made
massive investments in buildings, equipment, propaganda. As has probably
already been pointed out to you, they have passed hundreds of thousands of
copies of an official Soviet document saying that the decision of the world
community to hold the Olympics in Moscow is an acknowledgement of approval
of the foreign policy of the Soviet Union, and proof to the world that the Soviet’s
policy results in international peace.99
Carter’s observations of the value of the Olympic Games to the Soviet Union’s political
ambitions highlights assumptions about Olympic participation that stem from Berlin in
1936. Just like many of the unsuccessful American boycotters in 1936 Carter saw the
participation of the United States as an action enabling a government to continue human
rights abuses. The feeling of a moral responsibility to object to abusive host governments
was also heightened by hindsight and the knowledge of the atrocities that followed the
Berlin Games. The political implications of the decision to participate in the Olympics
are also illustrated by the deciding body in the 1980 case. In 1936 the AAU and AOA
made the decision to participate in Berlin, and the President of the United States, Franklin
D. Roosevelt, stayed completely out of the controversy.100 However, in 1980 the
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President made the decision as an act of United States foreign policy, indicating the
politicized nature of the decision. The assumptions present in Carter’s address were not
just indicative of the United States’ perception of the Olympic Games. Seventy-nine
other nations boycotted the Games along with the Americans. Although around forty-five
to fifty most likely followed the lead of the United States in boycotting the Soviets.101
After the Cold War instances of successful boycotts reduced partially due to the lack of
efficacy of the boycotts to create change.
Even though after the Cold War the boycotts subsided, the political implications
of what it meant to accept an invitation to the Olympics persisted. The most notable
example in the twentieth century was the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympiad. Although all
nations invited accepted their invitation, the thought of boycott hung in the air leading up
to the Games. Part of China’s platform during the bidding process, and one of the reasons
they secured the bid, was a promise to address human rights concerns within the
country.102 Among other reasons, the international community was alarmed by China’s
involvement in the Darfur and Myanmar conflicts as well as China’s position on Tibet.
As the 2008 Olympic Games quickly approached many international organizations found
Chinese attempts at compliance with their promises made during the bid process less than
convincing. The American non-governmental organization Human Rights Watch
reported, “thus far, Beijing’s compliance with its own promises and international
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expectations has been abysmal.”103 Given China’s relative non-compliance with its
human rights promises the question of a boycott came to the forefront of international
thought. Protests broke out across London, Paris, and the United States with prominent
political figures like the French Presidential candidate Segolene Royal advocating for
boycotts.104105 By the start of the Games on 2008 all invited nations sent teams to Beijing
as many nations saw a boycott as an ineffective way to address concerns with the Chinese
government. Also, the potential economic profit many international businesses stood to
gain from the Olympics tempered the possibility of a boycott as well.106 Although no
nation abstained from participation, various world leaders such as German President
Angela Merkel and the French President Nicolas Sarkozy personally boycotted the
Games in support of Tibet.107 Not every year following the 1936 Games saw a boycott,
but the ideological legacy left by the boycott effort in the early 1930s nonetheless
persisted and has become an inseparable aspect of the Olympic Games.
The concern about human rights violations and Hitler’s worrying policies within
the Third Reich stirred up anti-Nazi sentiment and raised questions about the need for
international intervention in the Third Reich. Despite the apolitical rhetoric surrounding
the Olympic movement pushed by some of its most influential leaders like, Henry
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Baillet-Latour and Avery Brundage, participation in the 1936 Berlin Olympics was a
political act. In the AAU session in December 1935 that decided the issue of American
participation in Berlin the resolution on the table stated, “participation must not be taken
to imply endorsement of the principles or practices of the Nazi government.”108 However,
by attending the Games, the United States and the rest of Europe tacitly supported the
legitimacy of the Nazi regime. Although one can only speculate on what would have
happened had multiple countries boycotted the 1936 Games, it seems reasonable to
categorize the 1936 Berlin Olympics as another instance of appeasement in the notorious
decade of the 1930s. The complicity of the international community in the 1936 Berlin
Olympics left a lasting feeling of political responsibility for the actions of the Third Reich
after 1936 that presented itself in efforts to boycott human rights abuses in subsequent
Olympiads. After the 1936 Olympics, accepting an invitation to the Olympic Games
became a symbol of acquiescence to the international and domestic policies of the host
nation. The political weight inherent in the acceptance of an Olympic invitation is a
modern phenomenon of the modern Olympic Games that began with the 1936 Olympics.
Theodor Lewald and the journey to Berlin in 1936 set new precedents with great
implications to the Olympic movement. Lewald’s strategy to win the Olympic bid
employed methods of persuasion never before used by host cities and inspired Olympic
bid advocates following him. The German IOC member’s use politics and persuasion of
IOC members for votes heightened the competitive nature of the selection process. The
intensified process of 1936 established the norm of using national political positions to
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ensnare IOC votes. Then, when the Olympics became profitable in the 1980s, the
diplomatic persuasion turned into corruption. The boycott efforts in the 1930s from
around the world, especially the United States, altered the Olympic selection process
irrevocably. Not only did host cities have to make it past the selection process of the IOC,
but beginning in 1936 host cities and the national governments associated with them had
to endure an informal vetting process conducted by the international court of public
opinion. The unofficial application to the international community’s acceptance is an
inextricable facet of the modern Olympic Games. The politicized selection process and
the international boycott in the 1930s were factors that made the 1936 Olympics truly
modern.
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Chapter 2: The Rise of Government Interest in Olympic Outcomes
The revived Olympic Games were never completely separated from government
political interests. In theory the Olympics were created as an apolitical celebration of the
triumph of the human spirit and a showcase for athletic achievement. Olympism, a term
coined by Pierre de Coubertin, is defined as:
Olympism is a philosophy of life, exalting, and combining in a balanced whole
the qualities of body will and mind. Blending sport with culture and education,
Olympism seeks to create a way of life based on the joy of effort, the educational
value of good example, social responsibility and respect for universal
fundamental ethical principles.109
Olympism and the Olympic Movement believe in the power of sport to bring nations,
races, and religions together to compete without thought of their differences. However,
Coubertin’s Games were easily influenced by the whims of nationalistic governments and
political conditions of the day from the start. In the years leading up to the grand political
spectacle of the 1936 Berlin Olympics the international sporting festival was colored by
international politics. The 1896 Athens Olympics experienced the sensitivity of
international relations when the Germans almost decided to reject their invitation to
participate after what they believed to be a slight from Coubertin and the IOC. The
Germans were miffed because they were not invited to the Sorbonne Congress in 1894
when the IOC was created and the Congress decided to revive the Olympic Games.110
Representatives from every other notable European power attended the Congress in Paris.
The Germans, despite the slight, still sent a small team to Athens.111
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The 1900 Paris Olympics were markedly lacking any political conflict or slights.
The absence of any international controversy was most likely a product of the
unenthusiastic organization of the Games by the World’s Fair organizers. The Exposition
greatly overshadowed the Olympic competition and some athletes did not even know
they had competed in an Olympiad until they looked at the Olympic inscription on their
medals.112 The Olympics by 1900 did not possess much international clout. Similar to
1896 in Athens, the 1904 Olympic Games in St. Louis also experienced the slight touch
of the hand of international politics. Coubertin, despite his great investment in the
Olympic Movement, decided to remain in France during the Games. The Frenchman
refused to travel to the third Olympiad because the World’s Fair in St. Louis celebrated
the Louisiana Purchase from the French.113 To Coubertin the Louisiana Purchase
symbolized French weakness, and the American celebration was insulting to the
Frenchman. At the 1908 London Games nationalism was a naturalized part of the
Olympic Games. The perfect example of the government involvement in the early
Olympic Games was the marathon in 1908. Originally only 26 miles long, the distance of
the marathon was changed to the current standard of 26.2 miles for the London Games.
The change was compelled by the wishes of the British monarchy. King Edward and
Queen Alexandria requested the marathon start on their property, Windsor Castle, and
finish at the Royal Box in the Stadium which added an extra 385 yards to the race.114
Aside from the active presence of the British monarchy the 1908 Olympic Games were
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also filled with political sensitivity, mostly from the Americans. After arriving in London
the American team, unsatisfied with the lodgings provided to them, viewed the sub-par
accommodations as an intended offense.115 The opening ceremonies proved to be
politically charged by competing nationalistic slights. The British chose not to fly the
American flag in the stadium. In response the American flag bearer did not lower the
flag in the presence of the British monarchs present at the ceremony as was the custom.116
Stockholm in 1912 also felt the weight of international politics. Nationalist
enthusiasm over the Games permeated the Olympic atmosphere as the press obsessively
tallied medal counts of the participating nations to declare a winner.117 Besides the
characteristic nationalism engrained in the Olympic Games global politics also intruded
on the 1912 Games. Tensions between Finland and Russia flared in Stockholm. In 1912
Finland was forced to compete under the Russian flag, and much to the annoyance of the
Russians, marched in the opening ceremonies with their own flag.118 In the closing
ceremonies of the Stockholm Games, although Berlin’s bid for the 1916 Olympics was
not yet official, the Olympic torch passed from Sweden to Germany.119 Prior to the 1936
Olympics, the 1916 Berlin Games were the most impacted by world politics. Due to the
outbreak of World War I the IOC cancelled the Games in 1915 and decided not to
transfer the Games to another city. Despite the cancellation of the 1916 Games the
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Olympiad still counted as the VI Olympiad because according to Coubertin, “An
Olympiad may fail to be celebrated; its number remains. This is the ancient tradition.”120
After World War I, much like the rest of the world, the Olympic Games did not
escape the political consequences of the largest military conflict the world had ever seen.
The first Olympics after the war were held in Antwerp during 1920. The Antwerp Games
and the following Paris Games in 1924 did not experience political tension during the
Games. The most notable aspect of the 1920 and 1924 Olympics were the noticeable
absences of Germany, Hungary, Turkey, Austria, and Bulgaria. The nations that
composed the Central Powers in World War I did not receive an invitation to Antwerp or
Paris because of their role in World War I.121 The punitive decision to exclude nations
from the Olympic Games based on the disapproval of the international community
indicated a new political ideal attached to the Olympics in the aftermath of World War I.
The same trend would be followed after World War II by forbidding the participation of
the former Axis Powers in the 1948 London Olympics.122 The Olympic Games became
an indicator of the governmental legitimacy of participating nations.123 The ideal of the
Olympics as a legitimizing force greatly influenced the recently appointed Nazi leaders
over ten years later when they received their chance to host the Olympics. The 1920
Games also marked the first year the newly formed USSR decided to abstain from the
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Games because of the new government’s disinterest in the international sporting
festival.124 The USSR abstained from Olympic competition until 1952.
The 1928 Games in Amsterdam experienced minimal international tension, but
gained significance because the former Central Powers were invited to the Olympic
Games for the first time since the war.125 Finally, the 1932 Games in Los Angeles also
possessed an air of political congeniality like the Olympic Games of the 1920s. The crash
of the United States stock market and the subsequent world depression implanted itself at
the front of the international focus in 1932, consequently pushing out political conflict.126
The Olympic Games were never the apolitical international event of Coubertin’s
dreams. Rather from their start they reflected the political climate of the time they
occupied. If the Olympics prior to the 1936 Games were influenced by politics and
nationalism, then what made the 1936 Berlin Olympics different? The 1936 Berlin
Olympics are set apart from its predecessors because the Games were actively used as a
tool of political manipulation by national governments whereas previous Games were
simply reflective of political climates and governmental attitudes. 1936 was a watershed
moment for the Olympic Games because it revealed the potential for the Games to enact
political change, for better or worse. Throughout the course of Olympic preparation and
the Games themselves the Nazis successfully pushed their own political narrative of
“Aryan” superiority. By the end of the 1936 Olympics the Germans walked away with
the most Olympic medals. With eighty-nine medals in total the Germans beat the rest of
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the world, including the Americans who came in second with fifty-six.127 Not only did
the Germans win total medal count but the German Olympic team came away with the
most gold medals as well. In 1936 Germany won thirty-three gold medals with the
Americans coming in second with a total of twenty-four.128 Hitler’s efforts to
demonstrate the strength of the ‘Aryan’ German people through control of the Olympics
succeeded and set a precedent for government meddling in sport, specifically the
Olympics. The Nazis’ triumph in 1936 brought about the politicization of sport within
nations and demonstrated the possibility of transforming Olympic Games into a fanfare
of propaganda.

“Aryanization” of Sport Within Germany
Another area of the Olympic Games the Nazis politicized was sport within
German borders. Hitler and the Nazi regime injected the government’s “Aryan” ideal into
every level of sport in Germany. Historically, sport in the German lands was closely
associated with nationalism. The militarized gymnastic style, known as Turnen,
developed in the early nineteenth century in the midst of the Napoleonic Wars. The
creator Ludwig Jahn viewed the new form of physical exercise as a way to “unify the
divided German Volk and to drive the hated Napoleonic invaders from sacred German
soil”.129 Turnen’s main goal was “national education and military readiness.”130 By the
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start of World War I, Turnen was the main form of physical activity taught in schools and
boasted the largest number of sports organizations in Germany.131 However given
Turnen’s military purpose, the German defeat in World War I led to a decrease in the
prominence of the exercise form and a rise in the popularity of the British conception of
sport.132 Throughout the 1920s Weimar era sport increased in popularity and by 1928
when the Germans were invited back to the Olympics the Weimar government propelled
German sport forward by investing in proper facilities.133
By the 1930s German sport established itself as one of the elite athletic powers of
the world. In the 1928 Amsterdam Olympics the Germans came in second behind the
Americans.134 The rise of the Nazis, called into question the future of German
participation in international sports. Hitler’s interest in sport prior to hosting the
Olympics stemmed from racialized ideals of a German state. In Mein Kampf, he writes,
“The State that is grounded on the racial principle and is alive to the significance of this
truth will first of all have to base its educational work not on the mere imparting of
knowledge but rather on physical training and development of healthy bodies.”135 Hitler
believed the value of sport stemmed from its ability to create a physically strong “Aryan”
German state. Hitler disliked the idea of pure “Aryans” competing with lesser races, and
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especially disliked the Olympics which he characterized as “a plot by freemasons and
Jews.”136
Once Hitler and the Nazis came to power in 1933 Theodor Lewald managed to
obtain Hitler’s approval to move forward with the Olympic Games and Goebbels’ pledge
to handle publicity for the Games personally.137 The 1936 Berlin Olympics presented a
unique propaganda opportunity for the Third Reich and the Nazis seized on it
immediately. The Nazis started by inserting themselves into the planning process. Host
governments of previous Olympics often cooperated with organizing committees, but the
Nazis in 1936 surpassed cooperation and delved into the realm of cooptation. The Nazis
assumed complete control of the planning operations. After news of Theodor Lewald’s
Jewish ancestry came out the Nazis demoted him from his position on the Organizing
Committee. However, after the protestations of the IOC, Lewald received a mostly
ceremonial reinstatement. As a condition of continued participation “He [Lewald] signed
a secret Interior Ministry document stating that while the GOC retained the authority to
deal directly with the IOC, Germany’s Olympic organizers must defer to Reich officials
‘in all essential matters of policy’. The GOC’s ‘independence’ therefore, was purely for
show.”138 The Nazis successfully infiltrated the GOC and set Lewald up as a puppet to
carry out the wishes of the Third Reich.
Despite the secrecy of the statement Lewald signed, the makeup of the GOC was
a very visible indicator of the heavy involvement of the Nazis in the planning of the
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Olympic Games. Of the 47 members of the Organizing Committee forty members came
from a variety of governmental departments.139 Six represented the Reich Ministry for
Public Enlightenment and Propaganda, five came from the Reich War Ministry (not
including the many decorated members of the German military on the committee), four
were from the Reich and Prussian Ministry of the Interior, and the rest represented a
variety of ministries from finance to transportation.140 To compare, the Los Angeles
Summer Olympics in 1932 boasted only 29 members on the Organizing Committee with
zero members holding any sort of position within the federal government.141 The
Organizing Committee for the 1932 Games consisted mostly of Los Angeles business
leaders and attorneys motivated by a desire to develop the Los Angeles area. The most
politically connected of the members previously held elected offices in the Los Angeles
Chamber of Commerce.142 The Nazi government’s insertion of government officials into
the Organizing Committee gave the Nazis complete control over the planning process, an
abnormality in the history of the Olympics prior to 1936.
Aside from creating a Nazi controlled Olympic organizing committee, Hitler
“Aryanized” sport throughout Germany as well. Starting in 1933 sports clubs in Germany
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adopted the “Aryan paragraph,” a policy banning the membership of Jews.143 The
German Olympic team, like the private sports clubs, was no different. Hitler’s 1936
Games were meant to showcase the success and dominance of the “Aryan” race. Jews on
the Olympic team ran counter to this goal. Despite giving assurances to the international
community that German Jews would not be discriminated against in the formation of the
Olympic team, only two Jews were accepted on the German Olympic team as a way to
appease the international community. In an interview conducted by the USC Shoah
Foundation, the Jewish high jumper Gretel Bergmann (now Margaret Lambert) recalls
her experience on the German Olympic team. In the interview Bergman says that even
though she was on the Olympic team she was barred from all the training facilities except
for when the time came for Olympic trials.144 The only other Jewish athlete on the
Olympic team in the summer of 1936, and the only Jew allowed to compete in the
Summer Games, was a fencer named Helene Mayer. The process of “Aryanization” in
German sport is not in itself indicative of the Olympic movement in the postwar years.
Rather, the success of the 1936 Olympic Games set a precedent of government
involvement in Olympiads.
The 1936 Berlin Olympics created a trend of increased government intervention
in the administration of sport and Olympic teams in the years that followed. While the
infiltration of the Olympics by a government did not reach the level of extremity of the
Nazis’ 1936 Games in each Olympiad, the same type of government involvement in the
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success of a nation’s Olympic athletes certainly became a common sight. The Nazis
exercised the power of the government to control which athletes made the German
Olympic team and push their racialized agenda through sport. A similar example of
attempts by national governments to control sport within its borders and push a
nationalistic agenda is the prevalence of state sponsored doping. National governments
providing performance enhancing drugs to athletes, reflects the same effort to push a
national agenda through government control of sport as the Nazis’ “Aryanization” efforts
in the 1930s. Spurred by the heightened feelings of nationalism following World War II
and the beginning of the Cold War, the Olympics became another outlet for nations to
assert their dominance on the world stage much like the proxy wars in Korea and
Vietnam. One of the most extensive state doping efforts in Olympic history was the
German Democratic Republic. Beginning around 1975 the German Democratic Republic
systematically drugged an estimated 10,000 athletes over a number of years.145 Many
athletes did not know they were being given performance enhancing drugs, while others
were forced into consuming the drugs.146 Aside from the 1970s German Democratic
Republic Olympic team, the Soviet Union and more generally, the whole Soviet-bloc,
“actively promoted the use of performance enhancement” during the Cold War.147
The presence of state sponsored doping was not simply isolated to the Cold War
years. Most recently, a 2016 investigation into the Russian Olympic team revealed one of
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the most prolific doping cover up operations in Olympic History. The McLaren Report,
the document reporting the findings of the official investigation found, “There was a
program of doping and doping cover up in Russia, which may have been engaged in to
enhance the image of Russia through sport. That doping manipulation and cover up of
doping control processes was institutionalized through government officials… as well as
sport official and coaches.”148 Once again the desire to achieve nationalistic aims through
domination in sport and the Olympic Games prompted government involvement in the
development of Olympic teams. The propensity for extreme government control exerted
over the development of a nation’s Olympic program originated in 1936 Berlin.
Another example of government manipulation of sport within its borders was the
scandal surrounding the Chinese gymnastics team. Similar to the “Aryanization” and
doping scandals, the Chinese government falsified the ages of gymnastic participants
with the hope of gaining a leg up on the international competition. In the 2000 Sydney
Olympics, the Chinese gymnast and bronze medalist, Yang Yun, provided documentation
to Olympic Officials stating she was sixteen, the minimum age for gymnastic
competition. Following the Games, Yun stated in an interview that she was only fourteen
during the Sydney Games, and received instructions to lie about her age.149 Records from
before the 2000 Olympics supported Yun’s assertion. The Chinese gymnastics team age
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suspicions surfaced again at the 2008 Beijing Olympics. In 2008 Olympic gymnastics
officials raised questions about not just one Chinese participant, but three. Once again,
the gymnasts’ passports maintained they were sixteen, but given the falsification of
Yun’s records in 2000 many like, the lead women’s gymnastics authority, Bela Karolyi,
remained unconvinced.150 The underage Chinese gymnastics team reflects the common
desperate measures taken by a government to ensure success and nationalistic glory in the
Olympic Games.
Government supervision and control of the Olympic planning process was another
legacy of the 1936 Berlin Olympics. Since 1936 many Olympic Games since have been
coopted by governments eager to seize the unique propaganda opportunity the Olympic
Games provide. An excellent case study of the trend can be seen from some of the Games
of the new millennium. The 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, despite the supposed
independence of National Olympic Committees (NOCs) and Organizing Committees,
turned into the passion project of Russia’s authoritarian ruler, Vladimir Putin. From start
to finish Putin and the Russian government played a large part in the entire Olympic
process. The Russian President involved himself in every aspect from the selection of the
desired host city, which typically was the responsibility of the NOC, to the construction
of facilities.151 During the entire seven year process Putin did everything from advocate
for Sochi with the IOC in the bid process to plan the construction of the Olympic venues.
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Putin’s involvement in the Olympic planning process stemmed from a desire for a
“public relations triumph” to uplift Russia in the eyes of the international community.
The Russian President’s spare no expense attitude towards the Winter Games, along with
allegations of the government skimming off the top of the Olympic funds, produced the
most expensive Olympics ever.152 The supposed final tab came in at an estimated $51
billion, with most of the expenses falling on the shoulders of Russian taxpayers.153 The
transformation of the 2014 Winter Games into Vladimir Putin’s pet project presents an
extremely blatant case of government involvement in the planning process of the Games.
Although not every national government went to such lengths as state sponsored
doping or the coopting of the planning of the Games like in Sochi, government
involvement could not be removed from the financing of the Olympic Games after 1936.
Given the Olympic Games’ increasing popularity following the 1936 Olympics,
government involvement in the execution of the international event became an
inextricable aspect of the Olympic Games. The climbing size and expenditures for the
Olympic Games beginning in 1936 Nazis dramatically made the price of hosting the
Olympic Games skyrocket after World War II. The increase in the cost of hosting made
the monetary support of the national and city government crucial to financing the
Olympic Games. From the period between 1956 and 1980 the national government
provided significant funds to the Organizing Committees and increasingly took on more
and more financial responsibility. In 1956 Melbourne hosted the XVIth Olympiad. The
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Organizing Committee secured a promise from the government of the Commonwealth
and the State of Victoria to provide £200,000 for the Organizing Committee to use in
case of a deficit. The amount the governments actually ended up contributing totaled
£300,000.154 The 1964 Tokyo Olympics secured funds from the Tokyo Metropolitan
Government totaling approximately $4,308,333 with some help from the National
Treasury.155 The cost of the Olympic Games continued to climb with national
governments taking on a larger role in the financing of the Games. In the 1968 Mexico
City Olympic Games the Mexican government provided $56,816,000 in subsidies to help
finance the Olympics.156 The 1976 Summer Olympics in Montréal were the height of
government financial aid to the Olympic Games. Despite the Organizing Committee’s
promises to make the Montréal Games self-financing without dependence on the
Canadian government to cover a deficit, the cost totaled $1,596,000,000 and was the
most expensive Olympiad up to 1976.157 However, the revenue generated from the
Games came in significantly under the about 1.5 billion dollar mark. After subtracting the
revenue made from the Games the deficit totaled about 1 billion dollars.158 The Canadian
government ended up contributing $142 million, not including the contributions from
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lower levels of government like, Québec and the City of Montréal, to the Olympic
cause.159 The total debt of the 1976 Games took thirty years to pay off completely.160
The 1976 Montréal Olympic Games were the culmination of the worries about the
unsustainability of the financial cost of the Olympic Games. Montréal caused the
international community to question whether or not the rising costs of the Olympics
could be sustained.
After Montréal, a new era of Olympic financing blossomed. The Olympics were
given new life through commercialization. After 1976 the Games reached an impasse.
Either the Organizing Committees found more ways to create revenue to finance the
Olympic Games, or the costs of hosting would rise too dramatically thus decreasing the
financial feasibility of any city hosting the Games. The Organizing Committee of the
1980 Moscow Games successfully budgeted and financed the Olympic Games with the
Soviet government only financing infrastructure which was incorporated into the State
Plan for the Development of the USSR National Economy.161 Although, it should be
noted the cost of the desired infrastructure still incurred a high cost. While the 1980
Olympics reduced need for contributions from the government, the turning point in the
financial history of the Olympic Games was the 1984 Olympiad in Los Angeles. Prior to
securing the Olympic bid, the state government of California made clear it had no
intention to cover any deficits created by the Olympic Games. In 1984 the Los Angeles
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Olympic Committee managed to “hold an Olympic Games free of government financial
involvement.”162 The costs of services provided by the state, local, or federal
governments were all reimbursed by the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
resulting in zero costs absorbed by the government.163 However, despite the lessening of
financial burden placed on the national government of the host nation, logistical
operations depended on government fronting labor. Also, various Olympic revenue
sources still relied on government organizations to front the initial costs of revenue
generating programs such as commemorative stamps, the minting of souvenir coins, and
Oylmpic Lotteries.
Over the course of the Olympic history following the 1936 Olympics, government
involvement in the Olympic Games took different forms such as controlling Olympic
Team performance, planning and organizing the Olympic Games, and financing the
growing international spectacle. The Nazis’ efforts to “Aryanize” German sport
intensified the nationalistic spirit of the Olympic Games and increased the level of
government investment in Olympic success. The measures taken by subsequent regimes
like the German Democratic Republic, the USSR, China, Russia demonstrate the
continuation of the ideology set forth with the “Aryanization” of German sport in the
1930s.
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The Games as Propaganda
Part of what separated the 1936 Olympics from its predecessors and connected
1936 with the rest of the century’s Olympic Games was the Nazis’ use of the Olympic
Games as a giant propaganda opportunity. The Nazis’ rise to power followed the
selection of Berlin as the Olympic host. With the uncertainty displayed by the
international community about the intentions and politics of the new regime in Germany,
the 1936 Olympic Games provided the perfect opportunity to put international objections
to rest. Hitler and the Nazis manipulated every aspect and every moment of the 1936
Games simultaneously to hide the rampant racial discrimination and to praise the strength
of the “Aryan” Germans. The Nazis recognized the power of the Olympics as a
legitimizing force within the international community. By successfully hosting and
letting the world in to the German State the Nazis temporarily put to rest certain
international concerns and gained political clout on the international stage. Throughout
the Berlin Games the Nazis walked a very fine line between pushing a racial agenda and
pretending one did not exist.
One of the Nazis’ most striking uses of the public relations potential in the
Olympics was to hide the reality of Jewish discrimination within the Nazi regime. From
1933, as evidenced by boycott efforts, the international community took great issue with
the mistreatment of German Jews and other non- “Aryan” minorities. In response to the
boycotts the Nazis continually reassured protesting nations, and eventually began the
elaborate process of hiding signs of discrimination against German Jews from visiting
foreigners in 1936.
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One of the first propaganda efforts was the selection of “token Jews” to the
German Olympic team to satisfy the IOC and the countries threatening boycott. The
Nazis selected three Jewish athletes in an attempt to show the IOC the Nazis were
addressing concerns of the international community and adhering to Olympic ideals. Rudi
Ball, Helene Mayer, and Gretel Bergmann were the three Jewish athletes allowed on the
Olympic team. Ball, a half-Jewish hockey player, competed in the Winter Games at
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. In the case of Ball, the Nazis begrudgingly allowed him to
participate because without him the German hockey team’s chance of medaling seriously
declined.164 Helene Mayer was a half-Jewish fencer who won a gold medal as a member
of the German team in the 1928 Olympic Games in Amsterdam.165 Mayer’s mother was
“Aryan” which meant she technically could still be considered a German citizen
according to the Nuremberg Laws. The sports club she belonged to nonetheless expelled
her for her Jewish ancestry.166 The fencer physically looked like a model “Aryan” with
her fair skin and blonde hair.167 Mayer’s presence on the Olympic team was palatable
enough to the Nazis to allow her to compete in the summer of 1936. The same was not
true for Gretel Bergmann, a fully Jewish track runner living in exile in England. The
Nazis selected Bergmann, the only fully Jewish athlete on the German Olympic Team, to
respond to the external pressures from the IOC and appease boycotters in the United
States, France, and Britain.168 Bergmann’s opportunity to compete in the Olympics
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however turned out to be nothing but a propaganda move to ensure participation from
nations threatening to boycott. Even Bergmann’s time spent on the Olympic team was
marked with discrimination, breaking the promises of Lewald and Tschammer that
Jewish athletes would receive equal opportunities. The Nazis even took away
Bergmann’s choice to participate. Bergmann had been “invited” to try out for the German
Olympic Team in 1935 under threat of harm to her family in Germany if she chose not to
participate.169 The insincerity and propaganda driven inclusion of Jews in the Olympic
Games was made apparent by Bergmann’s performance at the Games. In the summer of
1936 Bergmann never made it on to the playing field. Bergmann was denied participation
in German Olympic qualifying meets thus preventing her from making the Olympic
team.170 However, Bergmann did not know she had not qualified until the American
Olympic Team began its journey to Berlin and Karl Ritter von Halt informed Bergmann.
Halt cited “inadequate qualifying performance” as the reason for her inability to compete
despite her first place finishes in practice trials.171 The Nazis used “token Jews” as
propaganda tools to convince the international community that they had upheld their
promises and to hide the reality of Jewish discrimination on the German Olympic Team.
The truly masterful propaganda feat executed by Hitler and the Nazis was the
successful hiding of the commonplace anti-Semitic sentiments and visible signs of
discrimination from international visitors in Berlin. The Nazis’ test run for their
propaganda efforts were the Winter Games at Garmisch-Partenkirchen. The Winter
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Games commenced February 6, 1936 only about two months after the AAU settled the
American participation question in an extremely close vote. Although the invitations had
already been accepted to the Summer Games the success of the Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Games was an opportunity for the Nazis to show the international community German
Jews were not being persecuted, showcase the competency of the Nazi Regime, and
create international confidence about the execution of the Summer Games. As one
Bavarian official put it, “The whole world will assess the prospects for a successful
Olympic year according to our preparations for the winter event.”172 GarmischPartenkirchen, a small town at the base of the Zugspitze mountain in Bavaria, did not
escape the reach of the Nazis and was considered to be an especially anti-Semitic
location. The town’s elected officials were enthusiastic members of the NSDAP and right
before the Games the town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen passed a Jewish expulsion bill.173
Aside from the Nazi party town officials the anti-Semitic publication Der Stürmer sat
readily available in vending cases on public street corners and signs forbidding Jews from
public spaces were displayed prominently throughout the town.174 For example, one
poster that hung in front of a Garmisch-Partenkirchen ski club read, “Admission of Jews
is Forbidden.”175 To prepare for the international visitors all signs like the one above
were removed from buildings, businesses, and the newly built road from Munich to the
mountain town.176 Along with the signs the copies of Der Stürmer were removed from
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the street and citizens and business owners were instructed to be cordial with all foreign
guests, including Jewish foreigners. However, it should be noted that Hitler did not throw
the weight of his authority into suppressing anti-Semitic feeling in GarmischPartenkirchen until the IOC president, Baillet-Latour pressured him to conform with
Olympic principles.177 Eventually, in order to appease tensions abroad Hitler stripped the
town of Garmisch-Partenkirchen of any physical signs of anti-Semitism.
During the period of competition at Garmisch-Partenkirchen Goebbels and the
Ministry of Propaganda controlled the German press. Not wanting any news getting out
to the foreign press that would taint the perception of the Games, members of the German
press were instructed to write of nothing but the athletic competitions.178 Goebbels and
the Ministry of Propaganda further regulated the media by approving which images taken
by German photographers could be distributed to the international press.179 To ensure the
foreign press gathered no stories of Nazi anti-Semitism, all Nazi officials were on their
best behavior. The good behavior originated from the top of the Third Reich. In the
opening ceremony of the Winter Games, Hitler showed surprising self-restraint and
limited his opening speech to the single customary line, “I hereby declare these Fourth
Winter Games, held in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, open.”180 Hitler, other high ranking
Nazis, and SS troops stationed around Garmisch-Partenkirchen avoided any overtly
political or inflammatory actions so the foreign press, especially the Americans, did not
have anything to write home about. For the most part, most international members of the
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press reported nothing but wonderful feelings about what the Nazis put together in
Garmisch-Partenkirchen. Frank Birchall, a reporter for the New York Times wrote, “There
is probably no tourist here who will not go home averring that unmilitaristic, hospitable
and tolerant country in Europe and that all the foreign correspondents stationed here are
liars.”181 The VIP treatment shown to the foreign press, complete with wining and dining,
must have also helped give international reporters a positive experience.182 Not all
reporters were quite as taken with Nazi Germany as Birchall. Specifically the Austrian
press held a much more critical view of the Games with one reporter asserting, “In many
respects the organization here has failed entirely.”183 Although there were critical
accounts of the Fourth Winter Olympiad from the likes of the American journalist and
Nazi critic Will Shirer, the overall feeling after the Garmisch-Partenkirchen Games was
one of success. Despite the warnings that the Nazis simply covered up their abuses
temporarily from Shirer and others, headlines praising the Garmisch-Partenkirchen
Games like, “Olympics a Gay Show; The Tall Bavarian Mountains are an Ideal Setting
for the Winter Games,” pervaded the international press.184 Going into the Summer
Olympics in Berlin the Third Reich felt confident about their propaganda efforts in
February, the international acceptance of the 1936 Berlin Olympics, and the Nazi regime.
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Hitler displayed just how assured he felt by the international community when he
blatantly breached the Treaty of Versailles and remilitarized the Rhineland in March of
1936.
When the time came for the 1936 Berlin Olympics the Nazis were experienced in
hiding Jewish persecution from international visitors. Very similar to the Fourth Winter
Olympiad in Garmisch-Partenkirchen all visible indicators of discrimination were
removed from public spaces where an international audience could potentially see. Once
again Hitler ordered all the anti-Semitic signs on the streets to be taken down.185 He
ordered the German press to cease printing any anti-Semitic content for the duration of
the Games. Der Stürmer once again was removed from newsstands and the Nazi regime
gave the German press a directive ordering “The racial point of view should not be used
in any way in reporting sports results; above all Negroes should not be insensitively
reported.”186
When the Third Reich was not trying to downplay or erase anti-Semitism it was
trying to promote the vitality and success of the Nazis and the “Aryan race”. The 1936
Berlin Olympics exalted the Nazi regime. From start to finish the Olympic Games
explicitly tried to link the “Aryan” Germans to the ancient Greeks in physique, culture,
and success. The Olympic torch relay was one tool used to not so subtly equate the glory
of the ancient Greeks to the “Aryan” race. Created by Carl Diem, the Olympic Torch
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relay began on the site of the ancient festival in Olympia, Greece and ended in the Reich
Sport Field in Berlin. Symbolically the relay represented the passing of the torch of high
civilization from the ancient Greeks to “Aryan” Germans. The event provided another
way for the Nazis to display their superiority through propaganda.
The Opening Ceremonies of the 1936 Olympics, previously an international
celebration of the collection of nations, turned into a ritualistic display honoring Hitler
and the Nazi party. As one newspaper headline noted the, “Fuehrer Key Man in Olympic
Show.”187 Before Hitler’s arrival into the stadium broadcasters updated the masses
gathered for miles outside the stadium with news like, “We await the Fuehrer every
moment. Never would this great field have been erected except for the Fuehrer. It was
created by his will.”188 Hitler continued receiving godlike treatment throughout the rest of
the ceremony from the excited spectators. As Hitler entered the stadium the chorus of
“heils” drowned out the sound of the broadcasters.189 When the “new Caesar of this era”
entered the stadium spectators leapt to their feet “with their arms outstretched and voices
raised in frantic greeting.”190 Finally, when the time came for the customary Parade of
Nations, once again the focus was diverted from the Olympic teams to the Führer. As the
Olympic teams marched through the stadium carrying the flags of their respective nations
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confusion ensued as athletes gave the “Olympic salute,” which looked very similar to the
Hitler-Gruss. Despite the intention of the athletes, some of which may actually have been
saluting Hitler, the mostly German crowd interpreted the gestures as an homage to Hitler
and Germany.191 In response to each saluting nation the crowd roared and cheered in
approval of the international salutatory recognition.192 In the official report of the Berlin
Olympic Games images reveal the crowds enthusiastic reaction in response to the Parade
of Nations. One image captures a sea of people in the stadium raising their right hands
out in front of their bodies in an enthusiastic salute with the caption, “The flag of every
nation was greeted in this manner.”193 As a result of the crowd’s enthusiasm and the
purposeful programming of the event, the Opening Ceremony transformed into a
nationalistic fanfare in celebration of the Third Reich supported by the enthusiasm of
most of the visiting nations.
Aside from the bombastic and nationalistic reactions of the crowd of over 100,000
people gathered in the Reich Sport Field, the German Organizing Committee, controlled
by the Nazi party, meticulously planned the programming of the ceremony to control the
narrative surrounding the Third Reich.194 For example, the first ever torch lighting at the
end of the torch relay was perfectly timed to coincide with the end of the performance of
the Olympic Hymn. Just as the original composition by one of Germany’s greatest living
composers, Richard Strauss, produced its final notes, Fritz Schilgen entered the
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stadium.195 Schilgen, a tall, lanky, blond-hair, and blue-eyed runner ran across the
stadium, climbed the stage, and set ablaze the tripod built to hold the Olympic flame the
next sixteen days.196 The tripod, fashioned after the common ancient Greek piece of
furniture often used for sacrificial purposes, hearkened back the ancient origins of the
revived Games.197 Schilgen’s final run was a physical representation of the “Aryan” race
as the torchbearers of civilization in the modern world, much like the Greeks in the
ancient world. Another example of purposeful propaganda messages in the opening
ceremonies was the GOC’s decision to assign the task of organizing the Parade of
Nations to a Wehrmacht major practiced in choreographing military reviews in Berlin. 198
The selection of an experienced military organizer ensured the ceremony was executed
impeccably to further the perception of national socialism as a superior form of
government able to compete with Western democracy and mobilize the masses. This
narrative would later be played out during Olympic competition. The opening ceremonies
were even used to soften Hitler’s image. Upon entering the stadium, a small blond child
approached the Führer and presented him with a bouquet of flowers, which he eagerly
accepted.199 Even the seemingly spontaneous and precious moment was orchestrated by
the organizers. The five year old child was none other than the daughter of the GOC
general secretary Carl Diem.200 For the Nazis, every second of the opening ceremonies
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presented an opportunity to show the world a purposefully edited version of the Third
Reich.
Olympic competition itself became a battlefield of ideologies. The participation of
non- “Aryans” in the Olympic Games presented an opportunity for the international
community to challenge the Nazi assertion of “Aryan” superiority. The most popular
figure often used to point to the defeat of Nazi ideology in the Olympic Games is Jesse
Owens. The African-American track runner won four gold medals at the 1936 Berlin
Games.201 Along with Owens, seventeen other African Americans competed in 1936 with
many medaling in their events.202 The other demographic that challenged Hitler’s master
race ideology was Jewish athletes. Nine Jewish athletes in total received Olympic medals
in 1936, including Helene Mayer, the only German-Jew to compete on the German
Olympic team in the Summer Games.203 While the non-“Aryan” competitors performed
well in the 1936 Summer Games and presented a challenge to Nazi racial ideology, many
have gone too far by saying the success of Jesse Owens and other minority athletes
completely invalidated the Nazis’ racial claims. In the end, despite the strong
performances from minorities, Germany walked away from Berlin with the highest total
medal count and gold medal count.204 The success of the German Olympic team in
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athletic competition, despite the success of minorities, acted as another form of
propaganda asserting “Aryan” superiority.
Finally, perhaps the piece of propaganda from the 1936 Olympic Games that truly
stood the test of time was the state sponsored film, Olympia, created by the famed
director, Leni Riefenstahl. The two part, almost four-hour long documentary captured all
the exciting moments of the Berlin Games, but also perpetuated the same tropes
promoted by the Nazis throughout the Games. The opening scene lasted approximately
fifteen minutes long and exalted the cultural and athletic accomplishments of the ancient
Greeks. The sweeping panoramic shots moving through the ruins of Olympia and the
insertion of famous Greek sculptures throughout gave an air of admiration and nostalgia
for the glory of the ancient Greek civilization. The scene continued with the
transformation of the famous Discobolus statue from marble into a live male athlete
which highlighted the beauty of the superior physicality of the ancient Greek
Olympians.205 Riefenstahl then transitioned from the celebration of the human form to the
lighting of the Olympic torch in the ruins of Olympia. From Olympia, Riefenstahl
followed the Olympic torch relay on its journey through Europe, all the way into the
Reich Sport Field where the Olympic Flame was ignited. The whole elaborate display
emphasized what was already noted about the torch relay. Riefenstahl during the opening
scene created a direct comparison between the ancient Greeks and Nazi Germany as the
culturally, physically, and politically superior civilization of their respective times. The
rest of the documentary showed footage from the opening ceremonies, the athletic
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competition, and the closing ceremonies. While the rest of the content of Olympia was
not nearly as symbolic as the opening scene, the film showed a well-executed, successful,
and joyful Olympic Games put on by the Nazis. The film Olympia, paid for by the Nazis,
was created as a way of immortalizing the glory and success of Nazi Germany in the
1936 Berlin Olympics for years to come.
All the effort the Nazis exerted towards presenting Germany under the Third
Reich as a thriving, successful, and peaceful state ultimately succeeded. The prevailing
attitude of foreign visitors leaving Berlin was overwhelmingly positive. Members of the
IOC walked away from Berlin praising Hitler’s Germany as great agent of Olympism,
and Avery Brundage even hailed the Berlin Games as the “best ever.”206 Average
spectators also returned back to their home countries with similar sentiments. In some
cases, international visitors seemed quite smitten with the act the German state presented
to them in Berlin. One journalist working for the Los Angeles Times enthusiastically
reported, “From the sun-bronzed blond frauleins of the suburbs to the highest government
officials including Der Fuehrer Adolph Hitler himself, all the ladies and gentlemen of the
German capital have put a new meaning into the word hospitality and set up a new
Olympic record for official and unofficial parties.”207 Hitler and the Nazis’ achieved their
lofty goals for the Summer Olympiad. Not only were visitors impressed with the “social
achievement of the German nation” in the three short years since the Nazis came to
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power, but many left Berlin believing the truth about the Nazis could not be as bad as the
rumors asserted.208 The success of the Nazi propaganda efforts uncovered the potential
power within the Olympic Games themselves to be a tool for propaganda.
Similar to the 1936 Berlin Games, the Olympiads following frequently used the
Olympic Games very intentionally to convey a specific narrative. The Games continually
were used to make a statement to the international community, or a nation’s own people,
but the most elaborate of the propaganda campaigns in the wake of 1936 were the 2008
Beijing Games. The heavily involved Chinese government used hosting the Olympics as
an opportunity to show the Western world the validity of their ideology and way of life.
Similar to the Germans in 1936, the Chinese government spared no expense for the
execution of the largest international festival to ever be held on Chinese soil.209 The $40
billion bill reveals just how invested the Chinese government was in the success of the
Olympic Games. One consistent criticism Beijing continually faced during the bid
process was the issue of air-pollution. In a response to the international community’s
worries, the Chinese government spent approximately $20.5 billion to clear out the air
pollution in the city.210 The massive reallocation of resources to deal with the long
standing pollution problem right before the Olympic Games was all a part of the Chinese
government’s efforts to sell a narrative of China as a developed nation on par with
Western metropolises, clean-air and all. Finally, in an ultimate exertion of government
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control of the Games, in an attempt to make the Beijing Games as pleasant as possible,
the Chinese government used the weather as a tool of propaganda. To avoid the forecast
of rain at the Opening Ceremonies, the Chinese government used its Weather
Modification Program to disperse rain clouds before they had a chance to quite literally,
rain on China’s parade.211 China’s meticulous attention to every detail, down to every last
rain drop, was meant to show the world the glory of the great nation of China, one of the
world’s leading economic powers, but also a nation of great culture and national pride.
The great fanfare and extravagance of the whole Olympic Games in Beijing exalted
Chinese nationalism and the narrative of China as a harmonious “green” nation distracted
from human rights violations. The Summer Olympics in Beijing served a similar purpose
as the 1936 Olympics. The Games provided the Chinese government an opportunity to
“come out” to the world and sculpt the narrative surrounding China through the
Olympics, much like the new Nazi regime accomplished in the 1936 Berlin Olympics.
With the heightened sense of nationalism established in 1936 followed by the
Cold War era, governments became more invested in the performance of national
Olympic teams. Through various methods of controlling Olympic outcomes and
perpetuating selected messages through the propaganda potential of the Games, national
governments developed a new arena though which to exert national dominance.
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Chapter 3: Technology and Media
The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the first truly modern Olympics because the
organizers made use of the emerging technological advancements and media of the day
as no one had before, completely changing the precedent for how successful Olympics
operated. In preparation for the 1936 Games the German Olympic Committee (GOC)
members focused on engineering new technologies to facilitate the events. The Nazis also
contributed to technological innovations through the backing of Leni Riefenstahl’s film,
Olympia, which pioneered advancements in sports photography that subsequently shaped
how sporting events were captured on film and in photographs. In conjunction with new
technologies created for the Games, the Nazis used existing technologies to launch an
Olympic media and advertising effort of unparalleled scale, which has since grown. The
attitude of the Nazi regime towards the Olympic Games, and the position of the Games in
an age of unprecedented technological growth placed the German state in a particularly
favorable position to use the momentum of the time and place to accelerate the Olympics
toward a new, modern, technological standard.
To understand the Nazis’ advancement of the Olympic Games into the modern era
one must understand the context within which the Berlin Olympics fell. The latenineteenth and early-twentieth century technological innovations changed the way the
world functioned. Coming off the Second Industrial Revolution and World War I,
Europeans had changed at a rate more rapid than any other previous time period. In the
fifty or so years leading up to the Games at Berlin new technologies irrevocably altered
human perceptions of time and space and how humans interact with others. For example,
with the invention of the telephone human perception of time and space shrunk, as
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physical distance and time were no longer barriers to communication. However, in 1936
the new possibilities resulting from the technological advancement had not yet been fully
realized outside the context of war. The advent of World War I in Europe pushed
technology further than ever before as national leaders invested resources into research
and development so as not to be put at a disadvantage on the battlefield. The 1936
Olympic Games combined the technological innovations of the previous fifty years and
an international event to create the first instance of a mass global spectacle. The Nazis
with their expert organization and propensity for propaganda were given an opportunity
at a very favorable moment in time. Their advantageous position allowed them to bring
together the technological advancement of the age and their propaganda machine to
create the first truly modern event of the twentieth and twenty-first century.

Technology
The technological equipment the Germans utilized and created specifically for the
1936 Games marked the beginning of the modern reliance on technology to facilitate the
Olympics. In preparation for the Games the GOC, under the supervision of the Nazi
government, endeavored to update previous technology to accommodate an event the size
of the Olympics.212 The organizers first tackled improving upon technological equipment
already in existence in order to enhance the experience of the over 100,000 spectators the
newly constructed Olympic Stadium could accommodate.213 Specifically, with such a
large venue, the need arose to develop loud speakers that “would not produce interior
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echoes” in the stadium.214 The solution originated in the research and development
departments of the German electrical industry, which revamped the loudspeakers created
for the Nuremberg rallies to service an even larger crowd.215 The German state also
spearheaded innovations with the purpose of improving the facilitation of the athletic
competitions. In previous Olympics the scoring and timekeeping relied solely on human
objectivity and competency. In order to decrease the possibility of errors in the often
contentious and highly emotional Olympic events, the government entity, Physikalisch
Technische Bundesanstalt, developed multiple new technological devices for use in the
1936 Games. One such innovation was a camera sophisticated enough to reliably capture
what would now be aptly named “photo finishes” in track and swimming events.216
Another was a very early computerized scoreboard used in diving events that displayed
the final marks of the judges.217 Finally, the GOC commissioned the creation of an
electric hit registering apparatus for fencing. The new pressure sensitive electrical system
more accurately recorded the hits a human judge may have missed during the fast paced
series of lunges and parries characteristic of fencing.218 The equipment produced for the
1936 Games reflected the type of technology the Olympic Games have depended on
since 1936.
One aspect of the Nazis’ 1936 Olympics that distinguishes the Berlin Games as a
distinctly modern spectacle was the use of radio broadcasting. By 1936 the Nazi regime
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was well acquainted with the medium of radio. Hitler and Joseph Goebbels in the
Ministry of Propaganda quickly realized the power of radio broadcasting, and from the
very start of the Nazi regime in 1933 the government used the effective tool to
disseminate party propaganda. For example, Goebbels commissioned and distributed the
Volksempfänger (people’s receiver), an inexpensive radio set; so all German people could
afford to access governmental broadcasts.219 While some may argue the 1932 Olympics
in Los Angeles was a modern sized event that preceded the Berlin Games, the argument
is difficult to support as the Los Angeles Games ignored broadcasting technologies like
radio.220 The organizers of the Berlin Olympics were the first to use radio expertly to
promote the competition in the years before the Olympic Games as well as to keep the
world enthralled in each moment of the Games as they progressed. Before the games
even started radio broadcasts aired throughout the world. The German Broadcasting
Company created a radio program entitled Olympia, designed to educate the listener
about the history of the modern Olympic Games, different types of Olympic sports, and
provide helpful tips for those interested in visiting Berlin.221 The media coverage during
the Games was even more extensive than the broadcasting leading up to the two weeks of
competition. Not only was live radio broadcasting a new form of media at the Olympics,
but the scale of the operation reached an unparalleled number of people throughout the
world. Over the duration of the Games, over 3,000 transmissions were made during the
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Games to forty different countries.222 The estimated number of listeners reached over 300
million people.223 The number of people around the world engaged in the real time
updates of the Games in 1936 was on a scale now commonplace to Games in the latter
half of the century. Rather than only those fortunate enough to travel to the Olympic
venues being able to follow the Olympics in real time, after 1936 millions of people
accessed real time updates. While the Berlin Olympics were no 2016 Rio Olympics
which boasted reports of half of the world’s population tuning into Olympic coverage, the
radio technology implemented by GOC with the help of the German Broadcasting
Company, was the first significant step towards the type of visibility achieved by the Rio
Games.224
The logistical challenge of creating the infrastructure to accommodate the volume
of radio broadcasting during the Games presented another technological hurdle the Nazis
had to overcome. The Nazis were well acquainted with domestic radio broadcasting, but
the Olympics forced the Nazis to figure out how to organize and technologically support
the large number of international broadcasters they expected to host at the Olympics.
Preparations to equip the Olympic facilities began months in advance of the Summer
Games. The GOC only chose the best radio broadcasters in Germany due to the
complications incurred by the packed programming of the Games. In order to
successfully broadcast all the events, a lot of which occurred simultaneously, the
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announcers underwent several months of training “in transmitting national and
international sporting events.”225 During the Games at any given time during the radio
broadcasts around 15 to 20 announcers of the German Radio sat poised at their
microphones waiting for their cue to begin.226 In order to accommodate the large numbers
of foreign broadcasters flocking to Berlin, 68 transmission facilities were built at various
locations around the city.227 The central convergence point of the 68 remote stations,
nicknamed the “40-Countries Exchange, was built in the Olympic Stadium under the
“Führer’s loge [sic.].”228 From the inside of the 40-Countries Exchange hundreds of
employees worked constantly sending transmissions received from the remote stations to
forty-one different broadcasting companies, which served forty different countries in 50
different languages.229 To accommodate the large number of transmissions the German
Broadcasting Company developed a switch board twenty-one meters long with 10,000
contacts, designed to receive every transmission from the 1936 Games.230 The massive
logistics operation needed to reach the 300 million listeners emphasizes the sophistication
of the operation and illustrates that the radio technology used and improved by the Nazis
turned the Games into a truly modern global spectacle.
Finally, one of the most significant, but least successful technological advances of
the Berlin Games was live television broadcasting. The 1936 Berlin Olympics were the
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first live televised sporting events.231 Yet the broadcasts in 1936 were minimal as
personal television sets were not available to the average consumer around the world.
Still, the events were broadcast to twenty-five different locations around the city of Berlin
including the Olympic Village where the athletes could watch the events through their
remote television set.232 Even though the Nazis were at the forefront of television
technology their equipment was still very primitive and the quality of the broadcasts left
much to be desired. In order to broadcast live events fifteen kilometers of television
cables had to be installed in the Reich Sport Field and only four sites were equipped with
the television cameras used to broadcast.233 Although the Nazis did not create a very
sophisticated television broadcast operation they were successful in exposing the
potential of the new platform. Despite the poor optics, the television rooms throughout
the city were packed with viewers anxious to watch the broadcasts. Obtaining a seat in
the television rooms was almost as competitive as securing a seat in the Olympic
stadium.234 The Reichspost, which oversaw the initiative, estimated after the end of the
Games that approximately 162,228 people had watched the Olympic telecasts.235 After
1936 television became an inseparable part of the Olympic Games. In the very next
Olympiad, in London 1948, the British earned the distinction of broadcasting to the first
home television.236 Since 1948 television became one of the leading ways people around
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the world consume the Olympic Games. Despite the limitations of the 1936 Berlin
Games’ television broadcasts, the Nazis and the GOC demonstrated the possibilities of
the new platform and introduced the revolutionary technology to the Olympic Games and
the modern era.

Sports Photography and Video
Sports photography and the dynamic recording of sports in film, today an integral
part of all sporting events, was a unique development in 1936 propelled forward by Nazi
propensity for spectacle and the innovations of Leni Riefenstahl in her documentary
Olympia (1938). The work done by Riefenstahl produced new methods for capturing
sports in photographs and motion pictures that provided the foundation for modern sports
photography. Historian Richard Mandell characterizes the advancements pioneered by
Riefenstahl when he writes, “To say that sports cinematography was in its infancy before
1936 is metaphorically as well as factually inaccurate, since self-conscious sports
cinematography was introduced to the world by Leni Riefenstahl.”237 Previous
undertakings to film sport had been well received and piqued an interest in using motion
picture cameras to capture athletic contests. The first instance of sports recorded on film
came from the 1908 London Games where a newsreel company captured the dramatic
finish of the marathon runner Dorando Pietri.238 In the short film of the controversial
finish, the exhausted Pietri crosses the finish line while being physically supported by
Olympic officials before he completely collapses. The footage reproduced the drama and
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excitement of athletic competition and showed that sports and cinematography could
produce a good pairing. Prior to Riefenstahl, the Americans in 1932 made an attempt to
produce a film about the Los Angeles Games, but the project never materialized.239
Despite previous attempts, Riefenstahl was at the forefront of the budding film industry.
Only about seven years prior to the making of Olympia did “talking pictures,” or films
with sound, come into existence.240 While Mandell discredits all work before
Riefenstahl’s, Mandell certainly is correct in the spirit of his words, as Leni Riefenstahl’s
documentary was a defining work of sports cinematography that pioneered new methods
to capture the fast paced nature of sports like never before, updated variations of which
are still used today.
Riefenstahl’s innovative techniques, quality of image, volume of footage, and
meticulous editing put her work in a completely different category and class than any
previous sports cinematography endeavor. After her documentary about the 1934
Nuremberg rally, titled Triumph of Will, the Nazi government, Riefenstahl received a lot
of attention from the Nazis, especially the Führer himself. Deeply impressed by her work,
Hitler asked her to direct another documentary chronicling the 1936 Olympics. The
idealized purpose of the documentary, as Riefenstahl recounts in her memoirs, was for
the film to communicate the great ancient ideals of the Olympic Games.241 On December
1, 1935, Leni Riefenstahl signed a contract with the Ministry of Propaganda committing
herself to the ambitious task of creating a documentary of the Eleventh Olympic
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Games.242 In her contract Riefenstahl acquired what no other press photographer or
reporter had ever possessed. On top of very generous government financing of her
project, she was given close to unlimited access to all of the Olympic venues.243 The “up
close and personal” access allowed Riefenstahl to capture athletic competition in more
detail than anyone previously, but it also presented unique challenges to the young
director. Riefenstahl devised new methods to shoot the fast-paced sports competition with
early film equipment that was usually anything but portable. Once given the contract,
Riefenstahl set to work building a skilled crew of eighty cameramen and assistants and
started strategizing the logistics to tackle the enormous undertaking.244 In the year leading
up the Olympics Riefenstahl and her crew tested and devised new equipment, and trained
for months to successfully shoot with it. Just to learn how to capture the diving sequences
alone her crew had to train for six months with specialty lenses.245
Although some of her innovations were not allowed on the day of the actual
Games out of concern for the well-being of the athletes, the final product was
groundbreaking in sports photography. One example of such innovations were the camera
dugouts Reifenstahl shoveled out next to the jumping pits and the sprinting tracks. The
gutters were used to procure low angle action shots of the track and field athletes.
However, after Jesse Owens almost fell into one of the pits, most of them had to be
filled.246 Other innovations created for Olympia were more successful, like the camera
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one of Riefenstahl’s crew created to capture underwater shots in swimming and dive
events.247 Riefenstahl also expertly devised new methods for shooting track events that
eliminated a cameraman and allowed the camera to move alongside the athletes. Also for
the track and field events, she created a rail system that made it possible for a camera
without an operator to move alongside a sprinter and capture the race to the finish.248
Similarly, at the rowing events, she ordered a one hundred meter platform constructed
adjacent to the rowing course near the finish line on which she placed a car that towed an
automatic camera to capture the final exciting legs of the races.249 The various
apparatuses, angle, and lenses created by Leni Riefenstahl guided the development of
sports photography at the Olympics, and in all of sport.
The access granted to Riefenstahl and her crew at the 1936 Olympics put the
sports photographer closer than ever before. Instead of providing a snap shot of the
audience’s view, Riefenstahl and her resulting Olympia produced a perspective that no
spectator could have obtained while at the Games. The advancement of sports
photography from a spectator snapshot to images and videos that provides an otherwise
unattainable vantage point is a defining quality of modern sports photography. Mandell
eloquently describes the difference between the modern sports photography Riefenstahl
helped pioneer and the era before, when he describes previous attempts at sports
cinematography, “One saw athletic events as though he were an astigmatic, myopic,
palsied spectator in the stands.”250 The new artistic and stylized portrayal of sport and
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athletics created by Riefenstahl fit beautifully in the Nazi’s world of the aestheticization
of politics and all other aspects of “Aryan” German life.

Media and Advertising:
Prior to the 1936 Olympic Games media and advertising played a trivial part in
the planning and execution of the international spectacle. In most of the previous
Olympics the main venue used to advertise the Games and cover them as they unfolded
were newspapers and magazine spots. Preceding Games had been successful in attracting
hundreds and eventually thousands of journalists, including a large number of
international reporters accredited all over the world. As early as the 1912 Stockholm
Olympics 445 reporters were present at the Games and over fifty percent of them hailed
from outside of Sweden.251 The numbers of journalists present at the international Games
only grew and by 1928, Amsterdam hosted around one thousand journalists, including
many from non-European nations. At the 1932 Games in Los Angeles the Americans
ramped up the media effort surrounding the Olympics surpassing any of the previous
Games. Organizers of the Los Angeles Games succeeded in drawing the largest crowd in
the short Olympic history. The first matter the organizers saw to was the creation of a
press department solely for the purpose of promoting the 1932 Games, which assembled
a list of approximately 6,000 foreign periodicals with which the Committee sent out biweekly bulletins of the Organizers’ progress.252 In addition to frequent bulletin’s the
Organizing created an official publication titled, “Olympic,” some editions of which were
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published in four languages.253 Aside from various publications the Organizing
Committee produced, Los Angeles also made efforts to entice journalists to make the trek
to Southern California. During the years of preparation for the 1932 Games, several
hundred journalists visited the LA Press Department.254 Los Angeles was also the first
Olympic event to really embrace communication technology by outfitting Olympic
facilities with telephones and telegraphs for reporters’ use, thus making international
coverage of the Games an easier task for traveling newspaper reporters.255 Finally, the
creation of an organized ticket selling operation provided more people than ever the
opportunity to take part in the Olympic Games. The Los Angeles Organizers lowered the
price of tickets and created a sales office equipped with phone in order to make the
Olympics accessible to a broader range of people. The strategies of the Los Angeles
Organizers successfully created excitement for the Olympiad and enticed more people
than ever to the Games.
While the 1932 Games had impressive media coverage and advertising efforts on
a larger scale than any Olympics before, the Germans made Los Angeles Organizers’
efforts look minimal in comparison. At the Berlin Games the German’s use of media and
advertising far exceeded any previous undertakings in scale and international reach.
Fueled by the need to bring a large number of people to the 1936 Games to offset the
incredible cost of hosting and show the superior prowess of German people to the rest of
the world, the Germans mobilized an unprecedented media effort. The first step in the
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publicity effort was to establish the Publicity Commission. Josef Goebbels and the Reich
Ministry of Propaganda took it upon itself to appoint the members of the newly formed
commission. In conjunction with the German Railway Publicity Bureau, the Publicity
Commission set up forty-four individual foreign offices in forty different countries.256
Once the public relations infrastructure was set up around the world, the real foreign
publicity effort began.
In the years leading up to the Games Carl Diem and the Ministry of Propaganda
were hard at work trying to get both international and domestic audiences to Berlin. The
international effort succeeded in reaching more people than ever before. The scope of
advertising ploys covered everything from plastering posters throughout the Buenos
Aires metro system to deploying an airplane bearing Berlin Olympics decorations to do
stunts above the city of Chicago.257 The German Railway Publicity Bureau sent out over
four million pamphlets to dozens of countries.258 The German Railway Bureau also
agreed to give all foreigners traveling to Berlin for the Olympics a 60% discount to
incentivize international patronage of the Games.259 However, the amount of written
information churned out and distributed by the German public relations effort was
incredible. As early as 1933 Carl Diem created an Olympics News Service.260 Diem’s
publication was a monthly newspaper sent to all Olympics-connected offices in the world
and the international press detailing the progress of the impending 1936 Games. At its

256

Diem et al., The XIth Olympic Games Berlin 1936 Official Report, 353.
Goldblatt, The Games; A Global History of the Olympics, 153-4.
258
Keys, Globalizing Sport, 146.
259
Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 87.
260
Mandell, The Nazi Olympics, 86.
257

89

height the Olympic News Service published 25,000 copies per issue and printed it in
fourteen different languages.261 The Publicity Commission also created a monthly
magazine titled, “Olympic Games 1936.”262 The magazine’s first publication was thirtytwo pages long, printed in four different languages and 60,000 copies were produced.263
At its height, the magazine was 86 pages long and 75,000 copies of the issue were
produced.264 The magazine even secured international advertisements from the likes of
the American multinational company Coca-Cola to place in its magazines.265 Besides the
periodicals the scale of simple advertisements such as posters, stamps, and pamphlets
reflected the scope of the mass marketing of the era it ushered in. Two hundred thousand
posters were sent to thirty-five countries.266 Thirty-five thousand pamphlets detailing
information about Berlin were sent out for free, along with thousands of postcards in
multiple languages.267 The full reach of the media efforts remains unknown as often the
promotional material such as posters, pamphlets, postcards, and photographs were
reprinted and distributed upon reaching their destination. Truly, the Nazi media effort
covered the globe with news of its Olympic endeavor. Ultimately the media efforts
successfully drew people to Berlin, especially foreign press. The Organizing Committee
enticed approximately 3,000 reporters to travel to the 1936 Games, “more than the three
previous Games combined.268 The German Olympic Committee and the Reich Ministry
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of Propaganda succeeded in mobilizing and informing people through the use of media,
and the Berlin Olympics produced a new model for future spectacles. The Nazi media
provided an example of how to effectively harness the power of the platforms available in
the still young twentieth century.
The Olympics of twenty first century are often defined by the use of innovative
technology, including sport photography and filming, and media. Although the current
Olympic Games increased the scale and sophistication of technology and media from the
1936 Olympics. Berlin was the first instance of the effective incorporation the
aforementioned staples of the modern Olympic Games into the international festival. The
presence of technology and media on a mass scale for the first time in Berlin allows one
to classify 1936 as the first truly modern Olympic Games.

The Advantageous Position of the Nazis
The timing and nature of the Nazi political machine situated the 1936 Berlin
Olympics in a perfect position to take advantage of the technology and media
opportunities previously unutilized in the organization of Olympic Games. The
coalescence of these various forces resulted in a fundamental change in the way the
Olympics and large spectacles were organized. The Nazi system allowed the 1936
Olympics to thrive and grow because the Nazis already possessed experience in the areas
of propaganda and spectacle. Although from the very inception of the modern Olympic
Games the ideal behind the Olympics inherently contradicted the reality of the Games.
The Nazis magnified this contradiction more than anyone before them. The supposed
ideal of Baron Pierre de Coubertin when he created the modern Olympics was to
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celebrate the athletic ability of individuals and decrease international tensions.269 In
reality, from the very first Olympics, the event was used as a nationalistic measuring stick
by which nations could compare their success and vitality to others. While previous
Olympics garnered support from the leaders of the host nation to execute the Games, no
other national government before the Nazis had been so intimately involved in every
aspect of Olympic planning. The unprecedented level of involvement, and specifically
monetary investment from the government, pushed the Berlin Games forward to establish
a new precedent for Olympic Games in technology and media.
Prior to 1936 the Nazis already built a solid foundation to logistically
accommodate large spectacles like the Olympic Games. The Nuremberg rallies from
1928 to 1938 required expert planning to successfully execute the weeklong festivities
and organize the hundreds of thousands of people in attendance. The Nuremberg party
rally in 1934 best exemplified the exceptional competence the Nazis possessed for
organizing events on the scale of the Olympics prior to 1936. The sheer number of
individuals in attendance in 1934, while not quite on the same scale as the Olympics in
1936, proved staggering. Approximately 519,000 Party affiliated individuals traveled to
Nuremberg for the festivities.270 On the proclaimed “Army Day” 300,000 spectators
looked on to a military parade in an ecstatic frenzy. 271 It was from these events that
Germany had a jump on the technology and processes needed to make an event of such
magnitude function. The Nuremberg rallies also demonstrated the regime’s particularly
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excellent command of the press and propaganda. The rallies themselves were a practice
in manipulation of public perception. Special care was taken to “pamper” reporters and
provide them with a positive experience of the rallies.272 The consideration shown
towards domestic reporters during the Nuremberg rallies increased, especially for
international reporters, in 1936. For example, the 105 international radio reporters
received complimentary housing in the city of Berlin along with translators, guides, and
all the press credentials needed to properly report on the Games.273 Along with generous
accommodations, all radio broadcasters had access to top of the line facilities at the Reich
Sport Field where they could work in soundproof transmitting cabins and use longdistance phone lines.274 The Nazis’ unique experience with party rallies provided them
with the proper infrastructure and planning process to make the Eleventh Olympic Games
the grandest the world had yet seen.
The Nazis were also in a particularly good position to modernize the technology
and media of the Olympics. The Nazi government’s desire to control the domestic
opinion of the Party prior to the 1936 Games made for an easy transition to control the
international perception of the German nation through influence of Olympic propaganda.
The 1936 Olympics provided an unparalleled opportunity for a positive international
show of the German nation during a time when many in the international community
were wary of Hitler and the Nazi government. The Ministry of Propaganda led by Joseph
Goebbels had plenty of experience with new forms of media prior to the 1936 Games.
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Specifically, the Nazis’ experience with radio and experimentation with television in
domestic matters prior to the 1936 Games allowed them to implement technology and
media effectively on a global scale for the Games. As noted previously, since the Nazi
rise to power, radio had been a medium used domestically for the dissemination of party
messages through the distribution of the Volksempfänger. With such domestic success in
radio, the Nazi party leaders saw similar potential for the medium of television. Prior to
the Nazi-era, the Weimar Republic had experimented with television, but Nazi
investment in the technology made it a reality. In 1935 a public venue for live television
broadcast viewing was opened in the Reichspost Museum.275 The Nazis’ propaganda
machine placed Germany in an advantageous position to organize a mass media effort
and put on the first technologically modern Olympic Games.
The Third Reich’ need for control translated into the need to oversee every aspect
of the Olympics like no other government, especially with financial support. Even though
the Nazi leaders attempted to hide their level of involvement in the Olympic Organizing
Committee, the Nazis were not shy about financing Olympics. In previous Olympics it
was not uncommon for the government of the host nation to allocate some funds to aid
the Olympic organizers with the cost of putting on such an event, but the amount of
money provided by the German government far exceeded anything previously. For
example, in the 1932 Los Angeles Games the money for the development of a new
stadium came from a combination of boosters’ efforts and two million dollar bond
appropriation measures passed in 1928 and 1931 by the voters of California.276 To
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compare, in 1934 the projected cost of all Olympic construction was 20 million
Reichsmarks, of which the government agreed to pay 14.5 million RM.277 The Nazi
government willing paid Olympic expenses when the Berlin government could not.278
This included the development of technological innovations like the first mobile
television transmitting unit installed on the Reich Sport Field with a price tag of 250,000
Reichsmarks.279 Spending was not simply limited to Olympic facilities and technology.
In true Nazi fashion, expenditures on propaganda were immense as well. Specifically, the
creation of the film Olympia was completely funded by the Ministry of Propaganda. The
contract Leni Riefenstahl signed with the Ministry of Propaganda allotted her a budget of
1.5 million RM for the production of the film and a personal compensation of 250,000
RM.280 To compare, the average German worker earned 2,500RM per year.281 The almost
indiscriminate spending on the part of the Nazi government allowed for the 1936 Berlin
Olympics to move the Games towards the modern era in scale, technological innovations,
and successful implementation of mass media and advertising.
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Conclusion
As the Olympic tradition marches on into the future, the Olympic Movement
cannot separate itself from its past. The Nazis, situated in a unique spot in history and
fueled by their own particular set of ambitions, created the first truly modern Olympic
Games and irrevocably changed the Olympic Movement. No matter the current feelings
towards Hitler and the Third Reich, the 1936 Berlin Olympic Games played a significant
role in the formulation of the Olympic Games as they are known today.
A short examination of the IOC today reveals the lasting impact of the Nazi
Games. The IOC’s continued changes to the selection process attempt to correct the same
concerns addressed in 1936 and reflect the politicization of the selection process brought
on by the international response to the Nazi regime. In a recent press release from
February 27, 2017, the IOC announced the implementation of Olympic Agenda 2020,
which “strengthens its [IOC’s] stance in favour of human rights and against corruption in
new host city contract.” 282 The IOC’s continued crackdown on human rights violations
stems from the conception of the Olympic participation as an inherently political act.
After Berlin, international concerns saddled political responsibility on the Olympic
Movement. Also, despite recent reforms to the selection process bribery continues to
present a challenge to the bid procedures. After the selection of Tokyo for the 2020
Olympic Games allegations surfaced accusing one IOC member of accepting bribes from
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the Tokyo Olympic Bid Committee to the tune of $1.5 million.283 The prevalence of back
door deals and political maneuvering, started by Theodor Lewald, to obtain an Olympic
bid is now an inseparable aspect of the Olympic Games.
Government investment in Olympic outcomes continues to be a characteristic
aspect of the Olympic Games. With the findings of the McLaren report, the nationalistic
tendencies usually associated with the Nazi Olympics and the Cold War era persist to the
current day. The prevalence of propaganda related efforts also persists the prospect of the
2022 Beijing Olympic Games one cannot help but remember the $40 billion nationalistic
fanfare orchestrated in 2008 and wonder what the People’s Republic of China has in store
for the 2022 Games.
The lasting impact of the Nazis’ use of technology perhaps is one of the easiest
legacies to visually see. The Nazis were the first to use television broadcasting for the
commercial purpose of sport, and since then, television has become one of the primary
ways audiences across the world view the Olympic Games. The evidence of the impact of
media and television on the Olympic Movement can be seen in an assessment of the Rio
2016 Games. According to IOC reports, the half the world’s population watched Olympic
coverage and official content on social media platforms received over seven billion
views.284 The Rio Olympic Games is considered the most visible Games in Olympic
history.285 The use of platforms such as radio and television in a commercial context
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during the 1936 Games to reach a mass audience persists through today, but with even
more platforms for audiences to find Olympic related content.
While the 1936 Berlin Olympics may be one of the most controversial Olympiads
in Olympic history, the 1936 Games is also one of the most influential games in the
development of the modern Olympic Movement. The Nazi Olympics altered the nature of
the selection process, changed the way national governments interact with the Olympic
Movement, and laid the technological groundwork subsequent Games used as a
springboard to push the Olympic Games to a scale never even dreamed of by the IOC in
1896. The defining characteristics of the Olympic Games in the modern era began with
the 1936 Berlin Olympics; the first truly modern Olympiad.
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